Father Cornely's Commentary on romans 5:12-19

 

2. — Just as through Adam condemnation, so through Christ salvation (5:12–21).
That through the one Christ, who for human beings, while they were still sinners and enemies of God, shed His blood, all the goods of justice and glory come to believers, the Apostle had already likewise asserted in the preceding pericope: through Christ they have gained access to the grace of justification (v. 2); they have been justified through the blood of Christ (v. 9); through Christ who died they have been freed from the terrors of divine wrath and, being reconciled to God, have peace with God (vv. 1, 9, 10); through the same Christ, raised from the dead and living gloriously, they will be made partakers of the glory of God (vv. 2, 10), and they now hold so certain a hope of their future glory that they already glory in it, and this even amid tribulations, since they know that through these very things hope itself is increased and grows (vv. 3, 11).

Now, however, “as if about to seek the cause why this reconciliation takes place through one mediator, a man” (cf. St. Augustine, Contra Iulianum VI, 4, 9), Paul, as though from a lofty watchtower surveying the whole history of the human race, returns to the beginnings of the enmity that exists between God and human beings. He teaches that God, in bestowing and diffusing justice and the goods annexed to it through the one Christ, follows the same path and method which the human race had followed when, in the one Adam sinning, it fell away from its Creator and made itself, as a whole, subject to sin and its consequences. For by comparing the origin and diffusion of salvation acquired through Christ with the origin and diffusion of condemnation introduced through Adam, he shows that the same relationship intervenes between Christ and those who are reborn from Him by faith, in relation to the justice and eternal life promised to the justified, as intervenes between Adam and his descendants, in relation to sin and death, which is the punishment of sin. The new section, therefore, in which this comparison is instituted, serves to illustrate and confirm the preceding one. For if through the disobedience of the first Adam sin and death were brought upon all who, being begotten from him, received his nature, it is not surprising that through the obedience of the second Adam justice and life are conferred upon all who, being reborn from Him by faith, share in His nature.

Accordingly, St. Paul, in order to compare the origin and propagation of justice and life with the origin and diffusion of sin and death, first of all recalls to his readers that sin together with its punishment was propagated into the whole human race through one man (v. 12), and he briefly proves this (vv. 13, 14). Then he shows that grace can much more easily be propagated from one to all, both from the very nature of grace itself (v. 15) and from its more powerful efficacy, which must manifest itself in a greater effect (vv. 16, 17). Having inserted these points, as it were for the sake of clarification, he returns to the comparison indicated in v. 12 and proposes and explains it in clear words (vv. 18, 19). Finally, lest anyone persuade himself that through the Mosaic Law the universality of the reign of sin and death has been taken away, he briefly teaches what role the Law has in this question; for he warns that through the Law offenses were increased, in order that the power of grace and justice might shine forth more clearly (vv. 20, 21).

Closely joining the new section to the preceding one, as is his custom, the Apostle presents the causal connection between Adam’s sin and death and the universality of sin and death in the human race as something known to his readers: “Therefore, just as through one man sin entered into this world (better: into the world; εἰς τὸν κόσμον), and through sin death, and thus (καὶ οὕτως) death passed into all men, in whom (ἐφ’ ᾧ, i.e., διότι, therefore because, or because) all sinned…” This statement requires a more careful explanation, so that it may appear more clearly with what justice the Church has always interpreted it concerning original sin. For it must be carefully noted that this doctrine is here not so much being set forth as something unknown, as being presupposed as something plainly known, since it is adduced in order to explain how, through the obedience of the one Christ, all who are regenerated from Christ are made partakers of justice and life.

First, however, something must be said about the connection by which this statement is joined to what precedes; for it is disputed to what the particle “therefore” (διὰ τοῦτο) refers. Among modern non-Catholics not a few refer it to the whole preceding argument, by which, from 1:18 onward, Paul demonstrated that all human beings are under sin and can obtain salvation only through faith in Christ. They maintain that this pericope (5:12–21) is the conclusion of that argument, by which the words “unto all and upon all who believe” of the thesis previously proposed (3:22) are explained and proved (Godet, Tholuck, Rückert, Holsten, etc.). But the Apostle already completed the demonstration begun at 1:18 at 4:25, and from 5:1 onward he began to treat of the fruits of the justice acquired for us through Christ. Moreover, he had already amply proved the universality of the justice which is by faith in 3:21 ff. and 4:9 ff.; and in this section he is concerned not so much with universal destination as with the origin of salvation, or rather with its one mediator, Christ.

Others among modern Catholic and non-Catholic writers, as already in antiquity with Haymo, Hervaeus, Thomas, and not a few others, refer the particle to the last sentence alone (“through whom we have now received reconciliation”) or to the last three sentences (vv. 9–11). These opinions can indeed be maintained insofar as in that last member or in those three sentences a kind of summary of the whole preceding section (5:1–11) is not without plausibility said to be contained. Yet more correctly and precisely, with many others (Cajetan, Toledo, Reithmayr, Bisping, Weiss, etc.), we shall say that the Apostle had the whole preceding pericope (5:1–11) before his eyes; for it all turns (as we have already said) on asserting that our whole salvation is through the one Christ. The connection, therefore, is this: therefore (namely, because through the one Christ we have access to justification and justice itself, reconciliation and peace with God, and a firm hope of future glory), the mode of recovered salvation is the same as that of salvation lost; just as through the disobedience of the one Adam sin and death passed into all who belong to Adam, so through the obedience of the one Christ justice and life are diffused into all who belong to Christ. Similarly St. Augustine (Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum IV, 4, 8), who seems to follow the same connection: “As there was one unto death because of sin, so also one unto life because of justice.” Indeed, that the principal force of the following section lies in this, that there is one author of justice and life, just as there was one author of sin and death, is clear both from our v. 12, in which that “through one man” holds the first place with great emphasis, and from vv. 15, 17, 18, 19, in which that unity of authors is repeatedly inculcated. Hence Chrysostom not without reason says that this comparison is instituted “so that when a Jew says to you: How has the world rightly obtained salvation through one Christ acting justly? you may answer him: How was the world condemned through one disobedient Adam?”

As regards the construction, almost all, following Origen, rightly hold that the sentence is incomplete (ἀνακόλουθον), since the apodosis, in which the other member of the comparison should be stated, is lacking. For the Apostle, since in the final clause (“in whom all sinned”) he judged that a proof had to be added in vv. 13 and 14, did not continue the begun comparison, but indicated the other member of it at the end of v. 14 in another and obscure form of sentence and construction (“who is a type of the future”), so that he might later (vv. 18, 19) explain it more accurately and clearly. The other member, however, is easily supplied from the first, almost in the way Origen already proposed. Less aptly, though agreeing with us in general, some moderns complete the construction by supplying at the beginning of the sentence the other member of the comparison from what precedes (“therefore through one Christ we have received reconciliation, just as through one man…”, or “therefore through one man is life, just as through one…” etc.). But they plainly err who deny that the construction is anacoluthic and begin the apodosis either from the words “and through sin” or from the words “and thus into all.” For, not to mention that the construction itself excludes that explanation, since the apodosis is not aptly begun either by καί or by καὶ οὕτως (which is not the same as οὕτως καί), the sense that results is altogether inept, not to say absurd; for what in this context could be meant by the sentence: “therefore (why, pray?) through sin death entered the world, just as through one man sin entered the world,” or “therefore (why?) death passed into all, just as through one man sin and death entered the world”? Others err less widely who, not sufficiently attending to the structure of the whole pericope, think that either v. 15 or v. 18 is to be joined as the resumed and repeated apodosis. For in vv. 15 ff. the Apostle sets forth not so much the similarity as the dissimilarity between the effects of Adam’s sin and Christ’s obedience, so that it does not correspond to our protasis; and in v. 18 a conclusion is drawn from what immediately precedes, as the particles show, whose protasis cannot certainly be taken as a mere resumption and repetition of our sentence.

Having premised these points concerning the connection and construction of the sentence, we pass on to its explanation. That when St. Paul says that through one man sin entered into the world, he means Adam, our first parent, is so evident from the whole pericope, which turns on comparing the disobedience of the one Adam with the obedience of Christ, and from parallel passages (1 Cor. 15:22), that one may rightly wonder that Pelagius (and similarly Aerius, it seems) persuaded themselves that Eve is here meant. Without doubt Eve sinned earlier in time than Adam; whence Sirach rightly asserts, “from a woman was the beginning of sin” (ἀπὸ γυναικὸς ἀρχὴ ἁμαρτίας). Eve was also the occasion both of Adam’s sin and of the most grievous consequences which Adam’s sin had; whence Sirach rightly adds, “and because of her we all die” (καὶ δι’ αὐτὴν ἀποθνήσκομεν πάντες), which the Vulgate renders less accurately, per illam, since in the Greek text there is not δι’ Ἀδάμ, but δι’ αὐτήν, in a sense similar to that in which the Wise Man said that “through the envy of the devil death entered into the world” (Sap. 2:24). But Paul is not speaking, as Sirach does, of the first actual sin committed in the world, that is, among human beings, which others then imitated, but of that sin “which is one in origin and, by propagation, not by imitation, is transfused into all and is proper to each” (Council of Trent, sess. V, c. 3); and this entered into the world, that is, into the whole human race, not through Eve but through Adam, and infected all human beings who descend from Adam by natural generation, the Blessed Virgin alone excepted, whom “in the first instant of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege of almighty God, in view of the merits of Christ Jesus, the Savior of the human race, [God] preserved immune from all stain of original sin,” as the sources of revelation testify and Pius IX solemnly defined.

By the name of “this world,” or rather simply “the world” (τὸν κόσμον), not a few, indeed, with Origen, understand either the place in which human beings dwell (the inhabited world) or earthly and bodily life, in which death has its place (that is, the complex of earthly and human affairs). With others, however, we prefer to understand the human race itself, because in the third member of the sentence the Apostle as it were resumes and explains the name “world” by “all men.”

More serious, however, is the question what “sin” (ἁμαρτία) here signifies, and in resolving it there is great disagreement among interpreters. From the outset must be rejected the explanations of those who, with the Pelagians, Zwinglians, etc., say that sin is used metonymically for the punishments of sin and designates death and other bodily miseries; and likewise of those who, with a similar admitted metonymy, together with the Socinians and rationalists, interpret sin here as a proclivity to sin or, what is almost the same, concupiscence. The context clearly teaches otherwise. For the sin by which death is said to have entered the world is expressly distinguished from the punishment of sin and is clearly designated as the proper cause of punishment, that is, as the guilt of fault. But concupiscence or a proclivity to sin does not of itself merit punishment, although evil acts which proceed from it incur guilt. Therefore neither death, which is the punishment of that sin, nor concupiscence, although the Apostle sometimes calls it sin “because it is from sin and inclines to sin” (Council of Trent, sess. V, c. 5), is here designated by the name of sin.

 

Nor do we judge that those speak correctly who understand by the name of sin here "actual sin in general" (cf. Aberle Tüb. Quartalschr. 1855, p. 457; Simar p. 53, etc.). For when Eve sinned before Adam, "actual sin" had already entered the world, whether the world is thought to signify the earth or the human race. But if they object that the name hamartia also in v. 13 means "actual sin in general," they ought to attend to the article which in our interpretation is prefixed to the noun twice, by which it is clearly taught that the noun is not used with the same meaning in those two sentences, even though they follow each other. If the meaning were the same, the article which was already prefixed in v. 12 could not have been omitted in v. 13.

Nor is it permitted to understand Adam's actual disobedience, whether it is considered as his personal sin or is said to have passed to his posterity by imitation. For the former explanation is excluded by a similar argument by which we refuted the preceding one; but against the latter, St. Augustine already well said (in De pecc. mer. et rem. I. 9,9. 10): "If the Apostle had wished to commemorate that sin which passed into this world not by propagation but by imitation, he would have said its originator (i.e., author) was not Adam but the devil, about whom it is written: 'The devil sins from the beginning' (1 John 3:8; cf. Wis. 2:24, 25)... Therefore the Apostle, when he commemorated that sin and death which had passed from one to all by propagation, placed as its originator him from whom the propagation of the human race took its beginning. Indeed, as many as transgress God's commandment through disobedience imitate Adam; but one thing is (sin) which is an example to those sinning voluntarily, another which is the origin for those being born with sin... Just as He in whom all are made alive, besides presenting Himself as an example of righteousness to imitators, also gives to the faithful the most hidden grace of His Spirit, which He secretly infuses even into little ones, so also he in whom all die, besides being an example of imitation to those who voluntarily transgress the Lord's precept, has also infected with the hidden disease of his concupiscence all who come from his stock." Moreover, the very act by which Adam transgressed God's commandment, since in this treatise it is called paraptoma (transgression v. 15), paraptoma (offense or lapse vv. 15, 17, 18, 20), hamartema (sin v. 16, at least according to the Vulgate and some Greek codices; cf. variant readings), parakoe (disobedience v. 19), is distinguished by its own names from that sin about which, in our interpretation, the discussion concerns (he hamartia). And in reality it differs entirely from it, because it is taught to relate to it as cause to effect, since through the disobedience of one many (i.e., all) are said to have been constituted sinners (hamartoloi), i.e., to have been infected with sin (he hamartia) (v. 19), and through the offense of one (to hen paraptoma) condemnation is asserted to have been brought in (v. 18), to which indeed all are subject inasmuch as they are infected with that sin which entered the world through one man sinning through disobedience (cf. below on vv. 18, 19).

Therefore in v. 12, he hamartia can signify nothing other than that very sin which we call original, because man contracts it at his very origin, when, putting on human nature vitiated by the loss of supernatural justice (which God had willed to be in all men and therefore had conferred on the first man so that he might transmit it to posterity) through his offense and burdened with the guilt of fault, he is born a son of divine wrath. Moreover, with the article prefixed, the Apostle designates it not only as unique in its kind but also as known to the readers. For indeed, as we already mentioned above, from those things which the readers had admitted (namely, that there is one author of that sin by which all posterity of Adam are born infected as with something proper to them), he wished to illustrate how from the one Christ comes the justice by which all who belong to Christ are truly and properly constituted just. Furthermore, that this is the genuine meaning of the name he hamartia in this place will become clearer from the interpretation of the rest of the pericope.

According to the Apostle, therefore, through the one Adam sinning, original sin entered the human race; wherefore Thom[as Aquinas] not undeservedly concludes: "If Adam had not sinned, even if Eve had sinned, sin would not have been transmitted to posterity through this." Furthermore, it is added that through sin (dia tes hamartias; i.e., through that sin about which the discussion was) death entered the world, i.e., into the human race. Most correctly hold, from the time of St. Augustine (cf. De pecc. mer. et rem. I. 8,8) and Chrysostom, that death here should be understood not as spiritual (as below 7:10 sqq.), by which the soul is deprived of justifying grace (Origen, Pelagius, etc.), nor directly as eternal (as above 1:32), which awaits the damned and which St. John calls the second death (Rev. 2:11; 20:6, etc.), but as physical, by which the soul is separated from the body, since the Apostle not only clearly alludes to Gen. 2:17 and 3:17 sqq., but also immediately (vv. 13-14) demonstrates the universality of original sin from the universality of physical death. We willingly concede, however, that eternal death is connoted, because the context seems to demand it; for the kingdom of death introduced through Adam's offense is soon opposed to the kingdom of life brought by Christ (v. 17 sqq.). This opposition would not be sufficiently accurate if only physical death were understood, since the life brought by Christ, as all concede, comprises eternal glory beyond the life of the body resurrected from the dead. But others less correctly judge that spiritual death is also comprehended; for original sin, through which death is said to exist, since it consists principally in the privation of justifying grace, is not so much the cause of spiritual death as it is spiritual death itself. But just as by the name of sin (he hamartia) here Adam's own disobedience is not designated, so by the name of death (ho thanatos) is not understood the death of the first man, which quite a few wish, but the physical death of all men in general, of which the remoter cause certainly was our first parent transgressing God's commandment.

By these two first members, the Apostle recalled to the readers' memory that historical fact from which the causal connection of sin with death is established. Now indeed he adds in the second part of the sentence that the state of affairs which exists in the world corresponds to this fact: and thus (kai houto; i.e., according to the intimate connection which history teaches exists between sin and death and entered through Adam sinning into the whole human race) death passed through to all men, because all sinned. It must be carefully noted that the particle houto (kai houto) pertains to the entire two preceding members and cannot, except arbitrarily and rashly, be restricted to either one or to some phrase of either. Therefore, those must be said not to have grasped the genuine sense who have referred it either to only the first words (i.e., through one man), or to only the second member (i.e., through sin), or to the verb "entered" common to both members (and thus, namely, consequently to the entrance either of sin or of death or of both), or to only the connection of sin with death, although these last have come closer to our explanation and err from the truth only in that they neglect the first words (through one man). Indeed quite a few, because a certain opposition seems to exist between the words eiselthen (entered) and dielthen (passed through), preferring the penultimate explanation, establish that in the first part of the sentence the discussion concerns the entrance of sin and death into the world, in the second about their diffusion into all men; but this is done undeservedly, as is sufficiently clear from the explanation of the preceding members. Indeed, the Apostle, deriving as it were a conclusion from the historical fact commemorated in those to explain the present state of affairs, varies the words according to the difference of the substantives by which in each member he designates the universality of men: "Death entered into the world, i.e., into the whole human race, diffusing itself into all and individual men."

Many older Latin writers (cf. variant readings) omitted the subject "death" in the third member; whence it happened that St. Augustine (C. duas epp. Pel. IV. 4,7), against the Pelagians who read the subject "death" in their codices, also conjectured that "sin" could be supplied. But critical testimonies render certain the reading of today's Vulgate (death passed through); the supplement proposed by Augustine would also be rather unsuitable, because a tautology would arise: sin passed through to all because all sinned.

Elsewhere (cf. Comment. in 1 Cor. p. 506 sqq. and Comment. in 2 Cor. p. 441 sqq.) we have already noted that by these words of the Apostle, by which the universality of death is taught, the opinion of those is not excluded who hold that those just persons whom Christ will find surviving at His second coming will not die, but "will pass from this mortality to immortality without intervening death" (St. Augustine), so that their "body will not be abandoned by the soul, but with the soul dwelling in the body, what was inglorious before will become glorious" (St. Jerome). Just as, notwithstanding the universality of original sin asserted here by Paul, the Church teaches that the Blessed Virgin was preserved immune from original sin, because it is established by other testimonies of divine revelation that the doctrine must be restricted in this way, so nothing prevents us from judging, supported by other clear testimonies of Scripture, that those just persons, although the guilt of death is in them, will be exempted by God from undergoing this punishment. For "if God," says St. Augustine (Ad Merc. ep. 193,3), "who grants to so many of His faithful even their sins themselves, wished to grant to some also the punishment of sin: who are we that we should answer God: why one thus, but another thus?" Is it not permitted to God, whom no one denies can remit the punishments of actual sins, to remit the punishment of original sin to those just persons who, having patiently endured and bravely overcome the hardships of the times of Antichrist, as Tertullian speaks (De resur. carn. 41), have shown themselves worthy "to hasten by the shortcut of death expunged through transformation with those rising again, as the Apostle writes to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 4:14 sqq.)"? Does not the victory which Christ won over death also appear more splendid if He not only snatches from death, with life restored to them, all whom death has already claimed for itself as prey, but also preserves in life some over whom death claims certain right for itself?

That death, which entered the universal human race through one man, pertains to all and individual men is so manifest that it can be doubted by no one and needs no proof. But since the cause of this universality appears less clearly, St. Paul manifests it in the last member, looking back to the causal connection of sin and death, about which he had already said it is established from the credibility of history. For Thomas admirably notes that the Apostle inverts in the second part the order observed in the first part of the sentence: there, as if in the manner of historians, he proceeds from cause (sin) to effect (death); but here "he first treats the universality of death as being more manifest, then touches on the universality of sin." Therefore death passed through to all, in which (i.e., in that, or because) all sinned, or better: had sinned, since the aorist hemarton here, as often in secondary sentences, is used for the pluperfect. Namely, when Adam sinned, through whose disobedience all were constituted sinners (v. 19) and by whose offense all died (v. 15), and by the very act by which he sinned, the Apostle signifies that all his posterity sinned, so that they die because they sinned in him and with him, and are liable to the same punishment of death because they had some part in the divine commandment, the observance of which had been prescribed under penalty of death. But all are said to have sinned with him and in him, certainly not by their own will, which did not yet exist, but by the will of the protoparent himself, who had been constituted by God as the head of the human race in such a way that his transgression would in some way pertain to all his posterity and would constitute all truly and properly as sinners. It is indeed a great mystery how Adam by his disobedience so infected all who descend from him by natural generation with sin that it becomes proper to individuals; but it is no less a mystery how the second Adam, Christ, by His obedience truly and properly constituted all who are regenerated through Him as just, so that justice becomes proper to them. To discuss these mysteries and to illustrate them, as much as can be done, is the task of theologians; we assert only this one thing, that the words of Paul eph' ho pantes hemarton clearly contain the interpretation we have stated.

For if anyone should object that the words "in him and with him" are not expressed by Paul and are rashly inserted by us, we respond that they are supplied spontaneously from the context, since the whole sentence is governed by the first words "through one man," and that the Apostle elsewhere, where he speaks of the vicarious death of Christ, left the words "in him and with him" to be supplied by the prudent reader in exactly the same way: "if one died for all, therefore all died," namely, in him and with him according to their old man (cf. Comment. in 2 Cor. p. 161 sqq.). But if furthermore many modern non-Catholics (Reuss, Mangold, Weiss, etc.) wish to understand that eph' ho pantes hemarton thus with the Pelagians, so that all are said to be liable to the punishment of death on account of their actual sins by which they have imitated Adam's disobedience, they are refuted by Paul himself, who teaches that death also reigned over those who had not sinned in the likeness of Adam's transgression (vv. 13-15), and therefore did not have actual sins that were to be punished by death. Those finally who wish hamartanein in these words to be the same as hamartolous kathistasthai (to sin = to be constituted a sinner), they do not sufficiently attend to the propriety of words; since hamartanein is nowhere used except for the very act of sin, by which indeed someone is then constituted a sinner with habitual sin perduring.

According to our explanation, therefore, that all sinned in Adam is drawn from the Pauline words quasi-indirectly by the mode almost of a consequent sense; but most older Latin writers hold that it is declared directly, when they judge that the relative pronoun of the Latin expression "in quo" (in whom) is to be referred to the first words of the sentence "through one man" (namely, Adam). Their leader is St. Augustine, who at first indeed doubted whether the pronoun "quo" should be referred to the name of sin (through sin, death) or to the name of man (through one man, sin) (cf. De pecc. mer. et rem. I. 10,11), but later, noting that "in Greek, from which the epistle was translated, sin is placed in the feminine gender" (namely, he hamartia; cf. C. duas epp. Pel. IV. 4,7), persuaded himself that the words "in quo" could not be explained except as "in Adam." But this is not correct. For first, the construction itself already prohibits the pronoun "quo" from being referred to a noun so remote and separated by two intervening members. Then, just as the laws of the Greek language do not permit the pronoun ho to be referred to a feminine noun, so also they do not permit that sense to be attributed to the preposition epi which St. Augustine (and with him other Latin writers) attributed to the Latin preposition in here, when he says: "It remains to understand that all sinned in that first man, because all were in him [namely, seminally, as he adds elsewhere], when he sinned, whence sin is drawn in being born" (C. duas epp. Pel. IV. 5,7). For to express this sense of inclusion, the Greek preposition en is altogether required, nor has any Greek interpreter ever explained our epi by substituting en ho.

There are indeed among the Greeks and among modern non-Catholics those who in our passage take the pronoun ho as masculine and refer it to one or the other of the preceding masculine substantives, namely, either to ho heis anthropos or to ho thanatos. But truly those who refer it to "one man" attribute a causal sense to the preposition epi (equivalent to "on account of") and equate it with the preposition dia with the accusative, so that they come very close to the Pelagian explanation. Among whom Theophylact and especially Oecumenius, considering eph' ho to be the same as di' hon, proposes his own interpretation in these words: "Lest anyone accuse God of injustice, that when Adam fell we die, Paul adds eph' ho pantes hemarton (on account of whom all sinned) as if he were saying: he himself provided the beginning and cause that we all sinned in his likeness," namely, inviting us to sin by his example (he himself provided the beginning and cause that all sinned according to his likeness). But those who refer the pronoun ho to the substantive ho thanatos, as some Greeks did in antiquity according to Photius's testimony and some non-Catholics do today (Hofmann, etc.), they see declared by the preposition epi either the end, or if you prefer the outcome, to which sin tends or leads ("and thus death passed through to all, toward which [as if tending or about to arrive] they sinned") or the time at which all sinned ("and thus death passed through to all, which existing and dominating, all sinned"). But Photius (Amphil. V. 84. M. 101, 553 sq.) rightly admonished that the pronoun should be referred neither to Adam nor to death, nor should anything be supplied. "For eph' ho," he says, "here is not referred to a person nor to a quasi-person, but rather indicates a cause, and eph' ho pantes hemarton is the same as dia to (because) pantes hemarton." He then adds that six hundred examples of this signification of the words eph' ho exist in the writings of profane authors, yet he wishes to bring forward only the authority of Paul alone, who in 2 Cor. 5:4 used the words eph' ho for a causal conjunction (equivalent to hoti)! Moreover, Origen and Theodore had already preceded Photius in admitting the same signification, and perhaps even Chrysostom, although he speaks less clearly.

But it must be carefully noted that the Greeks are not correctly drawn to their side by the older Latin writers, because they looked not so much at their Greek words as at the Latin interpretation of the words. Now indeed, interpreters of patristic works often rendered the causal sense of the preposition epi with the dative by the Latin in with the ablative, just as our Vulgate does, but they did not think about that sense of inclusion which Augustine and other Latin writers wish to attribute to the preposition in here. Cf. what we have already said elsewhere about the causal signification of the preposition in (Comment. in 1 Cor. p. 20; Comment. in 2 Cor. p. 183), and what Patrizi S.J. admirably discussed about the interpretation of the Greeks (Comm. de pecc. orig. propag. Rome 1851 p. 26 sqq. and in an Italian dissertation on the same subject, Rome 1876; Beelen Comm. in ep. ad Rom. p. 153 sq.; Palmieri S.J. De Deo creante Rome 1878 p. 504 sqq.).

As for the Pauline use of the expression eph' ho, which is also taken here by the Syriac as a causal conjunction, it is used by Paul only in our sentence and in three other places. Indeed, it is rendered in various ways by our common interpreter (here and Phil. 3:12: "in whom," but 2 Cor. 5:4: "because," and Phil. 4:10: "as"); but there is no doubt that the second interpretation (because or for this reason, for eph' ho stands for epi touto hoti) is to be preferred. For the causal signification can be said to be certain both here and in 2 Cor. 5:4 and Phil. 3:12, and in Phil. 4:10 it is at least far more probable, because the comparative interpretation, which is chosen there by the Vulgate and Syriac, produces a rather unsuitable sense. Furthermore, among the more recent Latin writers, Cajetan and Seripando have already taken it as a causal conjunction; Toledo, Salmeron, Bellarmine (Controv. de gr. amiss. IV. 3), Estius, Lapide, etc., have held the same explanation as probable, and almost all moderns have adopted it as certain without any hesitation (Patrizi l.c., Beelen, Rethmann, Maier, Disp., Lange-Reithmayr, Weinhausen, Schegg, etc.); similarly most modern non-Catholics, among whom Meyer interprets our passage well.

Therefore, presupposing what he had just recalled to the readers' memory—that death entered the human race through sin and passed to individuals, so that in this order of things death is always the punishment of sin—St. Paul now proves that men indeed therefore die because they sinned in and with Adam. 13. For until the law, sin (hamartia without the article) was in the world; but sin (hamartia without the article) was not imputed when there was no law (or according to the Greek: hamartia de ouk ellogeitai mē ontos nomou, with Amiatinus and other Latin versions: "but sin is not imputed when there is no law"); 14. but death reigned from Adam to Moses even over those who had not sinned in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a type (typos) of the future or second Adam, i.e., Christ. "By common consent most obscure and most difficult"—some have said of these sentences not without reason (Toledo, Salmeron, Justiniani, etc.), if we attend to the very many and greatly diverse explanations of them that have been proposed since the age of the Fathers. Nevertheless, whoever, having carefully considered the connection of ideas, has understood that Paul wishes to demonstrate his assertion—that all are liable to death on account of sin committed in Adam—by a quasi-negative or rather exclusionary argument, and has explained certain words which are per se ambiguous according to this purpose of the Apostle, will judge the apostolic argumentation to be sufficiently clear and evident.

For lest anyone object that men are punished with the penalty of death on account of each one's actual sins committed in this life, the Apostle turns the readers' attention to that time when the Mosaic Law, which threatened death to transgressors, had not yet been given, and only the natural law inscribed in hearts, which does not have such a sanction attached to it, was in force. Therefore, from the fact that the actual sins of that age could not be punished by death due to the lack of a law that would establish the penalty of death for transgressors (v. 13), but nevertheless even in that age all were subject to the dominion of death (v. 14), he rightly concludes that the penalty of death is inflicted on all because they had some part in Adam's disobedience, which according to the precept given in paradise was to be punished by death. However, according to his custom, he does not expressly state this conclusion, because it becomes known spontaneously from the premises. But let us examine the particulars more carefully.

Many of the older Latin writers (Haimo, Herveus, Lombard, Thomas, etc.), along with St. Augustine (Expos. nn. 27, 98; De pecc. mer. et rem. I. 10,12; C. Julian. VI. 4,9, etc.) and most Greek Fathers (Origen, Chrysostom, Theodore, Cyril of Alexandria, etc.), blocked for themselves the genuine understanding of this passage by an erroneous interpretation of the words "until the law" (mechri nomou). For although correctly holding that by the name of law (nomos), even though the article is absent in Greek (as also in 2:12 sqq. 23, 25, etc.), the Mosaic law is designated, they erred in this: that, having badly explained the preposition mechri ("until"), they judged that not the beginning but the end and terminus of the Law was indicated, and wished the whole time from Adam to Christ to be signified! For although the synonymous particles heos and mechri are sometimes so used that they look to the end of the thing in question, and therefore per se nothing prevents the expression mechri nomou from being explained as "until the end of the Law," nevertheless in this place this explanation is plainly excluded both by the second member, by which the same time is defined by the words "from Adam to Moses," and scarcely harmonizes with those words by which infra (v. 20) the very beginning of the Law is proposed as an intermediate terminus between Adam and Christ. Wherefore, with Lyra, Dionysius, and other older writers (Theophylact, Oecumenius, etc.), almost all more recent and modern scholars (Cajetan, Toledo, Salmeron, Justiniani, etc.; Beelen, Meyer, Maier, Bisping, etc.) rightly hold that only the pre-Mosaic time, when men lived in the state of natural law, is designated by the words "until the Law."

Also not correctly, some older writers (Herveus, Thomas, etc.) understand by sin (hamartia), which Paul testifies was present at that time, original sin, as if hamartia here signified the same thing as he hamartia in the preceding verse; for in our sentence the article could not be absent if the noun were to be taken in the same sense as in v. 12. Therefore, with most scholars, actual sin in general, which the entire primitive history proclaims was not lacking in the pre-Mosaic time, must certainly be understood to be "in the world," i.e., in the human race. Nevertheless, the actual sins which were committed before the Sinaitic legislation and were in the world, i.e., in the human race, were not and could not be the cause of death for the men of that age. Wishing to demonstrate this, Paul, according to the customary Greek reading, brings forward a universal axiom: "but sin is not imputed when there is no law," but according to the more usual Latin reading he uses the same axiom applied and as it were limited to the pre-Mosaic period: "but sin was not imputed when there was no law." Whichever reading is preferred makes no difference to the sense, because neither diminishes the force of the argument. Against most moderns, however, I judge that the Latin reading should be preferred both because of the greater authority of the critical witnesses supporting it (for in addition to two most ancient versions, the Itala and Syriac, two excellent Greek codices, Sinaiticus and Alexandrinus, come forward, along with many Greek lectionaries; cf. variant readings), and because of the greater harmony of expression. For this member would not correctly be said to be opposed to the former by the conjunction de ("but"), nor is it said to be rather suitably subjoined to it, as if it were the Minor of some syllogism, but it must be said to be connected to it (de [transitional]), so that it continues the historical argument begun, which is completed in v. 14. Whence the imperfect elogeitο ("was imputed"), which corresponds to the preceding ēn ("was") and the following ebasileusen ("reigned"), seems more suitable to historical argumentation.

Furthermore, there is no doubt that the name hamartia (without the article) is to be taken in the same sense as in the former member and signifies actual sin in general, but it is rather incorrectly understood by some older writers (Herveus, Thomas, etc.) as original sin in both members. But there is greater disagreement among interpreters about in what sense the verb ellogein and the name nomos should be taken here. Now the verb ellogein, which is read as used only once by profane writers in a certain inscription (Boeckh Inscr. gr. I. p. 850, a. 35) and only twice in Scripture (here and Philem. 18), is synonymous with the verb logizesthai (cf. on 4:3), so that it most closely signifies "to enter in accounts" and is correctly rendered by the Latin imputare ("to impute"), as is most clearly evident from Philem. 18. Furthermore, by whom and to what sin was not or is not entered in accounts or imputed is not indeed stated in express words, but is declared quite openly by the context, which teaches that the discussion concerns the imputation—and that divine imputation—of sin to punishment, not to just any punishment but to the penalty of death. For immediately (v. 14) the universal dominion of death is presupposed as a divine penalty inflicted on the whole human race. Therefore, sins committed before the Mosaic legislation were not entered in God's accounts as worthy of the punishment of death; but it is added that this was not done because there was no law at that time. From this connection it is again clear that the discussion does not concern divine moral law in general (for no one denies that at that time natural law divinely inscribed in hearts was present), but truly concerns some divine positive law (i.e., externally promulgated), which, similarly to the precept given to Adam and many precepts of the Mosaic Law—indeed, similarly to the whole Mosaic Law—threatened its transgressors with the penalty of death. Because we follow the Latin reading, nothing per se prevents us from understanding by the name of "law" in this member the Mosaic law itself directly, especially since in the former member of this sentence "law" is taken in the same sense. Nevertheless, we prefer the more general explanation proposed, because the Apostle, as seems to result from the following sentence, also had before his eyes the precept given in paradise. Therefore, the sense of the sentence will be this: Adam was punished by death because he transgressed the divine precept announcing death to the transgressor; but from his fall until the Mosaic Law, which had the same sanction of death attached, there was no divine law that established the penalty of death for sinners; therefore the men of that age, although they frequently violated the divine law inscribed in hearts, neither were nor could be punished by death for these crimes of theirs. But if anyone objects that at that time men were divinely destroyed by the universal flood, the burning of Sodom, etc., on account of their sins, it is correctly responded that for them not death itself but the manner of death was the punishment of actual sins; for even Noah and his sons, Lot and his daughters, etc., died, although they were not guilty of the crimes that were divinely punished by the flood and fire.

In roughly this way many more recent writers (Toledo, Justiniani, Natalis, etc.) and most moderns (Reithmayr, Beelen, Maier, Bisping, Drach, Angry, etc.—Godet, Weiss, etc.) interpret our sentence, departing only in lighter matters. The same interpretation is also followed by Chrysostom, although he explained the words "until the law" less correctly, along with other Greeks, if from our sentence he concludes: "Whence it is clear that not that sin which is the transgression of the Law [or rather: which was committed before the Law and was in the world] but that sin of Adam's disobedience destroyed all," namely, by subjecting them to death.

But the ancient Latin writers, and with them a few more recent and modern ones, explain the passage in a far different way, disagreeing among themselves in most things and agreeing almost solely in this: that they judge the discussion concerns not divine but human imputation. According to St. Augustine (De pecc. mer. et rem. I. 10,12; Expos. nn. 27, 98; cf. also Abelard?, Herveus, Lombard?, Thomas?, etc.), who seems to have looked back to the earlier words "through the law comes knowledge of sin" (3:20), "not to be imputed" (or as he himself read: "not to be reckoned") is the same as "not to be known"; but, to say nothing of the fact that before the Mosaic Law, about which St. Augustine concedes the discussion concerns, many sins could have been and were known through the natural law, it is not understood what this sentence "before the Law sin was unknown" means in our context. According to Ambrose (cf. also Sedulius, etc.), sin before the Law was not imputed, insofar as men thought they were not made guilty of sin before God, since He was ignorant of human affairs, although they were made guilty before men. But this explanation too, to pass over other obvious objections, it is not apparent how it is accommodated to the context. According to Primasius and Abelard?, sin, as long as only the natural law was present, was not believed by others to be sin. Haimo brings forward three expositions, of which Thomas approves the first, and Lombard approves the second and third: first, understanding by the name of law here the natural law, he interprets thus: "As long as the natural law is not in man, as in little children, whatever the little child does is not imputed to be sin, because he does not know what is good or evil"; then, understanding by the name of law the Mosaic law, he explains: "Before the Law was given, it was not recognized that sin was so grave an evil as was shown through the Law," or also: "When the Law was lacking, it was not imputed, i.e., it was unknown what punishment sin was worthy of!" All of these do not need refutation; scarcely more apt is the explanation followed by Lapide and Meyer: "Sin was not imputed, i.e., it was scarcely reckoned, scarcely esteemed by men following only their nature and concupiscence and not having a law that would show the foulness of sin." Estius brings forward a strange exposition; although he correctly holds that the discussion concerns divine imputation of actual sins, looking back to 4:15 ("where there is no law, neither is there transgression"), he thinks that before the Mosaic Law sin was not imputed "as transgression." But what is actual sin except transgression or violation of some law? And indeed before the Mosaic Law there was present a certain law which men transgressing became guilty of transgression. But these things are sufficient; for it is not worthwhile to review the various opinions of non-Catholics, which are no fewer in number.

 

Now follows the second part of the argumentation, which is opposed to the first with great force through the adversative conjunction alla (but, nevertheless): before the Sinaitic Law, actual sins, which history testifies were also in the world at that time, could not be punished by death, nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, i.e., it was not only in the world in such a way that it merely snatched away some, but it exercised its dominion so that no one could withdraw himself from it; whence it spontaneously results, since death is the punishment of sin, that men of that age drew upon themselves the penalty of death by another sin, namely, that by which all sinned in and with the disobedient Adam. But to explain or, according to others, to augment the force of his argument, the Apostle adds that death reigned at that time even over those who had not sinned in the likeness of the transgression of Adam. According to the former interpretation, those are said "not to sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam" who do not, similarly to the protoparent, transgress a divine law to which the sanction of death is attached; therefore all who lived before the Law are designated by this formula and are distinguished both from Adam and from those who, living under the Law, could sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression. But according to the second interpretation, which St. Augustine (De pecc. mer. et rem. I. 11,13) and St. Jerome (C. Pelag. III. 18) proposed, Paul distinguishes two classes of men who lived before the Law: those who, committing actual sins by their own will, were made similar to Adam sinning by his own will, and those who "had not yet sinned by their own and proper will, as he did, but had contracted original sin from him." To this extent, therefore, the force of the argument is thought to be augmented by this explanation, insofar as death is said to have exercised its dominion before the Law not only over adults who had actual sins, but also over infants themselves who had not yet been able to sin actually. Both explanations are probable; however, I prefer the former, because the Apostle in this argument especially attends to the sanction of the divine law which is violated by sin.

St. Augustine elsewhere (Expos. n. 29; Ad Hilar. ep. 157,19) judges that the words "in the likeness of the transgression of Adam" are better connected with the preceding by hyperbaton, so that death is said to have reigned "in the likeness of the transgression of Adam" "over those who did not sin"; the same connection is also indicated by Chrysostom and some more recent writers (especially Toledo) altogether prefer it to the other. For they wish a reason to be brought forward by those words by Paul "why death reigned over those who did not sin (actually)," and that this reason is "because there was in their members the likeness of the transgression of Adam," namely, original sin (St. Augustine, l.c.). I do not deny that this connection can per se be admitted and that this sense can be extracted from the Pauline words, since the Apostle does not shrink from hyperbatons and the Greek expression epi tē homoiōmati not less than "in similitudine" (as St. Augustine reads in ep. 157,19) can per se aptly be explained as "on account of the likeness" (cf. what we said about eph' ho "in whom" on v. 12, p. 281 sqq.). Nevertheless, not only is there no reason here why we are compelled to take refuge in a rather harsh hyperbaton, but also the sense that arises is adapted to the context with great difficulty. For almost the entire force of the argument perishes, nor is it understood how Paul, after he taught that death passed through to all because all sinned (v. 12), could now assert that death reigned over those who did not sin. Wherefore we must retain the customary connection which almost all the rest follow.

Concerning the other reading of this member, which omits the negation (epi tous hamartēsantas "over those who sinned"), there is no need to discuss at length, because it is destitute of sufficient critical authority, although Origen, or rather his Latin interpreter Rufinus, and Ambrose followed it (cf. variant readings) and some older Latin writers commemorate it.

By the last words of v. 14: "who (Adam) is a type of the one to come," the Apostle, as we already showed above (p. 273 sq.), resumes the sentence begun in v. 12 and left in suspense by the argument of vv. 13-14, with the second member of the comparison added, certainly with an anacoluthic construction and a somewhat obscure sentence. How the words are to be expounded so that they clearly correspond to the former member, we have already said (l.c.). For truly Adam is called a type of the one to come (typos tou mellontos), i.e., a prophetic figure of that Adam who is to come as the second or last parent of the human race, namely, Christ (cf. on 1 Cor. 15:45 sqq.), insofar as Adam became for us the author of sin and death, but Christ the author of justice and life. There are indeed also other similarities between Adam and Christ, on account of which the former can correctly be called a type or prophetic figure of the latter (cf. Thomas, etc., Justiniani, etc.), but it appears from the context that the Apostle attended only to that which we mentioned, as being the principal one. But Christ is called the future Adam not in relation to us, as if in this place the discussion concerned the glorious second coming of Christ (which some modern non-Catholics have supposed), but in relation to the first Adam, since the discussion concerns the work of Christ's redemption. For the origin and diffusion of salvation acquired for the whole human race through the obedience of Christ the Redeemer dying on the cross is compared with the origin and diffusion of condemnation brought upon the whole race through Adam's disobedience. In this sense Chrysostom correctly says that Adam is called a type of Christ "because just as he, from those born of him, although they had not eaten from the tree, was the cause of death introduced through that food, so also Christ was the reconciler of justice for his own, although they had not acted rightly, which he bestowed on us all through the cross." Similarly St. Augustine (Ad Hilar. ep. 157,20): "Adam is a type of Christ by way of contrast, so that just as in him all die, so in Christ all are made alive, and as through his disobedience many were constituted sinners, so also through Christ's obedience many may be constituted just." Indeed, the holy Doctor adds in the same place a second exposition, which elsewhere (De pecc. mer. et rem. I. 11,13) he proposes alone; for he thinks that Adam can be called a type of the future race sprung from him "because he himself inflicted the form of death on his posterity"; but with good reason he himself calls it less apt in the epistle to Hilary and elsewhere (De nupt. et concup. II. 27,56) he altogether passes over it; for it does not harmonize with the context. But much less apt and more far-fetched is the third exposition of some non-Catholics (cf. Bengel, Koppe, Wilke, etc.), according to whom the relative pronoun hos (who) is placed by attraction to the substantive of the predicate (typos) for the neuter ho (which) and the genitive tou mellontos (of the one to come) is not of masculine but of neuter gender, so that to tou mellontos stands for ta tou mellontos systēmatos kai tēs sōtērias; therefore the sense would be: "what has been said about the origin and propagation of sin and death is a type of the future salvation and life."

Looking ahead to what follows next, Photius (cf. Oecumenius) not absurdly notes that in such types three things are to be considered: similarity, contrariety, and excess in similarity (homoiotēs, enantiōtēs, hyperbolē kata tēn homoiotēta); but in this place the contrariety is in this: that sin and immunity from sin, enmity against God and reconciliation with God, condemnation and justification, destruction fall death and salvation life resurrection are opposed to each other; the similarity in this: that just as evils happened to all through one, so goods came to all through one; the excess in this: that in evils many cooperated with one in order to draw them upon themselves, but in goods no one cooperated, so that the gift is owed to the one Christ, and that Christ not only took away the evils brought in through Adam but also in their place conferred many gifts. Indeed the Apostle, before he more fully explains the similarity indicated in v. 12 (vv. 18-19), wished to expound the dissimilarity in vv. 15-17, in order to confirm that evils introduced through one could be taken away through one (cf. above p. 271, 273). For this purpose he especially compares the source from which evils flowed with the source of goods in themselves (Salmeron), i.e., according to their nature and efficacy (v. 15), so that he may then show that the effects of the more powerful cause are also more powerful (vv. 16-17).

Lest anyone, therefore, hearing that Adam is a type of Christ, too hastily and inconsiderately conclude that there is perfect similarity or rather equality between them in all things, Paul immediately turns the readers' attention to their dissimilarity: 15. But not as the offense (to paraptōma), so also the gift (to charisma); for if by the offense of one the many (hoi polloi) died, much more the grace (hē charis) of God and the gift (hē dōrea) in the grace of one man Jesus Christ abounded unto the many (eis tous pollous, or with St. Augustine read: unto the many eis pollous). Most scholars, judging that already in this sentence, as in the two following, the effects of the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ are being compared, interpret the names to paraptōma and to charisma so that by the former is designated metonymically (cause for effect) the harm produced by Adam's sin, by the latter the grace acquired for and conferred on men through Christ. But lest we be forced to accuse the Apostle of verbosity as if he were always repeating the same things in other words with some non-Catholics (Maurice, Rückert, etc.), we must note that in this sentence, as we have already said, he compares the causes themselves with each other (cf. Salmeron, Toledo, etc.—Godet, etc.). Therefore to paraptōma (which name properly signifies a fall or abandonment of the right way, and is not badly translated by the Vulgate as "delictum"—offense!) here denotes Adam's own actual disobedience (cf. v. 18, "through the offense of one," v. 19, "through the disobedience of one"), but to charisma, as Salmeron correctly notes, is not here the grace conferred on us through Christ and inhering in us, but the very work of redemption as it were, namely, the obedience of Christ dying on the cross (v. 19) offered to the Father, which oblation, since it was made for us sinners and commends God's love toward us (v. 8 sq.), is aptly called charisma in relation to us, i.e., a gratuitous gift of love (cf. on 1:11).

Furthermore, that these two do not relate in the same way, i.e., are not equal, is proved by an argument that is indeed proposed in a hypothetical construction but has no doubt, because concerning the fulfillment of the condition there is abundant agreement among all according to the above (cf. similar arguments vv. 10, 17; 2 Cor. 3:9, 11, etc.). For from the fact that Adam's offense exercised its efficacy over all, he wishes to conclude a fortiori that the gift could also exercise equal, indeed greater, efficiency over all. Roughly in this sense Chrysostom says: "If the offense, and that of one man, prevailed so much, how will not grace, and indeed the grace of God, and not only of the Father but also of the Son, prevail far more? For this is much more consonant with reason. For that one should be punished on account of another seems less fair. But that one should be saved on account of another is indeed more fitting and consonant; if therefore the former, much more has the latter been done" (cf. Theodore, Theophylact, etc., Salmeron, Toledo, etc., Reithmayr, Maier, etc.).

As for particulars, we note before all else that by the expression hoi polloi (the many, "die Vielen") according to the most well-known idiom of the Greek language here, as often (v. 18 cf. v. 19; 12:5; 1 Cor. 10:17), all are designated, namely, on the one hand the multitude of all those who descend from Adam by natural generation, on the other hand the multitude of all those who are regenerated through Christ (cf. on v. 19 and on 1 Cor. 15:22). I think the Apostle chose this expression so that it might appear more clearly that both the offense and the gift exercised their efficacy not so much on the whole collection as on its individual members, although they are many. Then from the whole context it is clear that by the verb apethanon (died) physical death is most immediately designated, but spiritual death is connoted, insofar as physical death is considered as a punishment which passed through to all because all sinned in and with the protoparent (v. 12). Third, it must be noted how the two opposed causes are described; for when the offense (to paraptōma) is said to have been of only one (tou henos) man, but the gift (to charisma) is defined as "the grace of God and the gift (hē dōrea) in the grace of one man Jesus Christ," it is already taught by the words themselves that to the gift (to charisma) belongs a much truer and more certain (and also greater) efficacy than to the offense (to paraptōma); "for God is more powerful for doing good than man is for doing evil and harming" (Toledo).

The grace of God (hē charis tou theou), since it is here distinguished from the gift (hē dōrea), is correctly understood according to the primary signification of the word as divine benevolence, from which as from its source all good things emanate to us (cf. Eph. 1:7; 2:7; Luke 1:30; Acts 7:46, etc.); therefore it is as it were opposed to the wrath of God, i.e., to divine vindicative justice, which inflicts the punishment owed to sin (cf. on 1:18). From this grace of God, furthermore, the gift (hē dōrea) also emanates, which consists in the grace of one man Jesus Christ (cf. Acts 7:19), or less correctly according to others: which comes to us through the grace of one man Jesus Christ. If the former explanation, as is fitting, is preferred, the grace of Jesus Christ must be said to comprise all the benefits which he merited for men by his death and confers on us, but especially signifies justice (v. 17); if the latter is preferred, the grace of Jesus Christ can be explained in a similar way to 2 Cor. 8:9, so that it signifies all things indeed which he did and endured for our redemption, but especially the obedience by which he took upon himself a bloody death. But in either case Christ is considered as mediator, through whom the gift emanating from God's benevolence had to reach us, and his humanity is extolled (of one man Jesus Christ) not only so that he may be opposed to the one man through whom all were infected with sin and die, but also so that it may be understood that the discussion concerns his office of redeemer and mediator. According to this interpretation, which many moderns follow with Salmeron (Reithmayr, Maier, Lange-Reithmayr, Angry, etc.—Godet, Weiss, etc.), the words en tē are to be connected as an apposition with the name hē dōrea (as if it were written: hē dōrea hē en chariti, etc.); that the omission of the article before an apposition does not prevent this connection, we have often noted (cf. Comment. in 1 Cor. p. 60, etc.).

However, with most of the older and more recent writers, even some moderns (Beelen, Bisping, Schegg, etc.—Rückert, Ewald, Meyer, etc.) supply to the name hē dōrea, which demands some complement, the genitive tou theou (as if it were written: hē charis kai hē dōrea tou theou) and connect the words en chariti, etc., which they judge to be opposed only to the preceding to paraptōma tou henos, with the verb eperisseusen: "the grace and gift of God abounded unto the many through the grace of one man Jesus Christ." Following this explanation, Thomas says: "just as sin from one man abounded unto the many from the first suggestion of the devil, so also the grace of God proceeded through one man to the many; whence the Apostle significantly adds 'in the grace,' i.e., through the grace of one man Jesus Christ; for thus grace is poured out from God unto the many, that they may receive it through Christ." If the sense is regarded in general, this explanation does not indeed differ much from ours; but it seems less apt, because it shows much less clearly with what right the Apostle, concluding from the lesser to the greater, attributes to the gift a more certain efficacy than to the offense, when on the one side the offense of one man, on the other side only the grace of one man are placed as causes. But this must be held: that in this sentence especially the greater certainty of the efficacy of the gift is enunciated. But that the grace of God is at the same time said to have abounded (eperisseusen) unto the many, i.e., to have surpassed the efficacy of the offense, is expounded in the two following sentences, which according to his custom Paul seems to have wished to prepare by that "abounded." But those sentences would be superfluous if in our sentence he had already demonstrated the abundance of the efficacy of the gift. Furthermore, the aorists apethanon and eperisseusen (died, abounded) indicate that the effects of the offense and gift cannot not happen; for the efficacy of the former and especially of the latter (much more) is so certain that it is permitted to consider the fruits of both, although they are future, as already produced.

But after he showed that the causes themselves differ from each other according to their nature and action, Paul also teaches that the effects are so diverse that the gift far prevails: 16. And not as through one who sinned, (so also) the gift (or according to the customary Greek reading: kai ouch hōs di' henos hamartēsantos to dōrēma: and not as through one who sinned the gift; cf. variant readings); for the judgment (to krima) indeed was from one (ex henos) unto condemnation (eis katakrima), but the grace (to charisma, i.e., the gift v. 15) was from many offenses (ek pollōn paraptōmatōn) unto justification (eis dikaiōma). Most correctly hold with Thomas that the relation of the two members to each other is such that the former is explained by the latter (the conjunction gar, "for," is explanatory), but the proof follows only in v. 17. Similarly, almost all agree in defining their sense in general, when they judge that it is signified that the gift therefore prevails over the offense because it "has freed men not only from the sin which they contracted from Adam and from the ruin into which they fell when he fell, but also from many other sins which they committed by their own will, and from many precipices into which they themselves fell by their own choice" (Toledo; cf. Chrysostom, Cyril, Euthymius, etc., Haimo, Herveus, Thomas, etc., Cajetan, Estius, Justiniani, etc., Reithmayr, Beelen, Meyer, etc.). But since both members are elliptical and the Latin reading differs from the Greek, there is great variety in their accurate exposition, with different scholars supplying different things.

The earlier Latin member can be completed with Thomas so that it appears that the discussion concerns the effects of sin and gift: "not so great an effect," says Thomas, "follows in the many through the one sin of Adam as follows in the many through the gift of Christ's grace; for the effect of a more powerful cause is more powerful." The other member then, by which the former is explained, he expounds in this way: "For the judgment, i.e., divine punishment, proceeds from one, namely, the sin of the first parent, unto condemnation, namely, of all men, because in him sinning all sinned; but the grace which is given through Christ proceeds from many offenses, i.e., not only from that original one but also from many actual ones, unto justification, i.e., perfect cleansing." Beelen explains these things with Toledo in this manner: "If Christ were to free us only from that one sin by which we were made guilty through Adam, the relation of the grace obtained through Christ and the condemnation of which Adam was the cause would be equal; but now, since we are absolved from many, indeed from all sins which we added to the original by our own will, and are endowed with justice through Christ's grace, it follows that Christ's charisma is more powerful for saving than Adam's paraptōma is for destroying."

Among those who follow the Greek reading, many also complete the former member in a similar way to the Latins: kai ouch hōs di' henos hamartēsantos to dōrēma estin or echei ("and not as that which was effected through one who sinned is the gift" or "relates"). Much less pleasing is what others wish to supply either from the above or from the following: hōs to paraptōma (or to krima, or to katakrima, or ho thanatos) di' henos hamartēsantos, houtō kai to dōrēma estin ("not as the offense [or judgment, or condemnation, or death] came through one sinning, so also is the gift"). For these supplements are rather arbitrary and partly even erroneous, so that the first is rightly to be preferred. Whence there is no other difference between the Latin and Greek text except that in the former "through one sin" is read, in the latter "through one who sinned." This difference is not great, since the participle hamartēsantos, as Estius correctly notes, "must be taken formally here, i.e., insofar as he sinned"; therefore, when that one who sinned is understood to be Adam, the very first sin is indirectly signified. But if we attend to this signification, the difference which exists in the other member also disappears; for the Greek ex henos can only be masculine, since it must necessarily be referred to di' henos hamartēsantos, just as the Latin "ex uno" is neuter, because it is referred to that "through one sin." But there is no doubt that the Apostle by his ex henos wished especially that one offense of the one who sinned (i.e., Adam) to be understood; for this is evident from the opposing expression (ek pollōn paraptōmatōn, "from many offenses").

Furthermore, the Greek words by which the Apostle describes the difference of effects must be carefully weighed. And first indeed to krima (judgment according to the Vulgate) is properly the same as the sentence of a judge, which, when sin is in question, as here, is understood to be condemnatory (cf. 2:2-3; 3:8; 13:2), nor does it signify anywhere in Scripture the act by which a judge pronounces sentence (which Godet wishes). But to krima is immediately answered by to charisma (grace according to the Vulgate), by which name here (in the same way as v. 15) we judge that the very work of redemption is designated, insofar as it is considered as a gratuitous work of divine love. Then the condemnatory sentence is said to be ex henos (from one), i.e., on account of Adam sinning or rather of the one sin committed by him; but redemption, although it was already promised immediately after that one sin (Gen. 3:15), was not made except at the time when offense had already abounded (v. 20), therefore not on account of one but of many offenses (ek pollōn paraptōmatōn, "from many offenses"). Whence it appears that it pertains not to that sin alone which all contract from Adam, but extends to the remaining offenses, and therefore its effect is greater than that of Adam's disobedience. Finally, the condemnatory sentence which was passed on account of the one who sinned and of the one sin, was or resulted (egeneto must be supplied, or if you prefer ginetai, "results") eis katakrima, i.e., unto condemnation, insofar as the penalty of death announced by the judge's sentence has already been handed over to execution; on the other hand, redemption, which was made when offense abounded, resulted eis dikaiōma, i.e., unto justification, insofar as it effected that sins might be remitted by justifying grace given; whence again the effect of the gift is greater, because, as Chrysostom notes, it not only blots out sins but also confers justice.

 

In what sense the names katakrima and dikaiōma are used here is not sufficiently established. The former, which is rarely used by later profane writers and indeed always in the sense of a condemnatory sentence, but occurs only three times in Scripture (here, v. 18, and 8:1), is explained by most as a condemnatory sentence (katakrinō = to condemn); but this cannot be done. For by the context itself krima is already determined in this sense, but Paul could not have written that a condemnatory sentence became a condemnatory sentence. But if some wish to signify that a condemnatory sentence which was passed against one man on account of one sin became a condemnatory sentence for all men, the Apostle would necessarily have had to express this opposition and write thus: katakrima tōn pollōn (or pantōn). Wherefore we judge that condemnation itself handed over to execution is all the more designated by Paul by the name katakrima, because this signification alone fits all three places in which he uses it. — The other (dikaiōma), by which is designated as it were the effect of the action enunciated by the verb dikaioun, sometimes signifies in Scripture a justly established law or precept (1:32; 2:26, etc.), sometimes a deed done rightly or justly (v. 18, where it is opposed to to paraptōma and in the following verse is explained as the obedience of Christ; Rev. 19:8!); but neither of these significations fits our passage. But that some wish dikaiōma to signify an acquittal sentence (Fritzsche, etc.) is plainly absurd and excluded by the whole context. Therefore, I judge with the older writers that the name dikaiōma is here used for dikaiōsis; for truly, just as in our sentence katakrima and dikaiōsis, so in v. 18 katakrima and dikaiōma are opposed to each other in a plainly similar context; therefore by that parallel passage the sense of the word dikaiōma is sufficiently defined.

Now by a similar argument to that in v. 15, concluding from the lesser to the greater, Paul proves his preceding assertion, namely, that the gift especially excels the offense in that it truly justifies men: 17. For if by the offense of one death reigned through one, much more those who receive the abundance of grace and of the gift and of justice (or better according to the more approved Greek reading: ei gar tē tou henos paraptōmati ho thanatos ebasileusen dia tou henos, pollō mallon hoi tēn perisseian tēs charitos kai tēs dōreas tēs dikaiosynēs lambanontes: if by the offense of one death reigned through one, much more those who receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of justice; cf. variant readings) shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ. Concerning the connection of this sentence with the preceding, there is no agreement among commentators; for quite a few wish to connect it immediately with v. 15, so that either by a new argument it may be demonstrated that "grace much more abounded unto the many" (cf. Toledo), or v. 16 may be held as a parenthesis. But v. 16 can be held neither as a kind of prior proof of the difference enunciated in v. 15 nor as a parenthesis, since, being parallel to verse 15, it establishes a second difference. Therefore, with St. Thomas and some moderns (cf. Reithmayr, Angry, etc.—Godet, etc.) we hold that our sentence comes to the preceding as a proof. For the Apostle in v. 16 had indeed asserted that the gift of one brought justification, just as the offense of one had brought condemnation; but whence this is established he had not yet demonstrated. Wherefore now from the fact that the disobedience of Adam, by common consent, introduced the kingdom of death, he first concludes a fortiori that it must be conceded that the obedience of Christ introduced the kingdom of life (cf. on v. 15); then he insinuates that the kingdom of life presupposes in those who pertain to it the remission of sins and true justice, whence it spontaneously follows that the gift which was made through Christ on the occasion of many offenses, i.e., redemption, results in justification; which conclusion finally he expressly enunciates in v. 18. Thomas indicates a similar manner of arguing; for although he rather unsuitably calls the clause "receiving the abundance of grace, etc." the Minor of the argument, nevertheless he correctly proposes the argument in this syllogism: "Just as condemnation [rather: the kingdom] of death proceeds from the sin of the first parent, so the kingdom of life from the grace of Christ; for these two uniformly [or rather: as lesser and greater] correspond to each other; but no one can attain to the kingdom of life except through justice; therefore through the grace of Christ men are justified."

That death obtained and exercised a kingdom through one man and his one offense, the Apostle indeed proposes hypothetically, but because concerning the fulfillment of this hypothesis according to the above it is in no way permitted to doubt, he has in it a firm foundation of argumentation (cf. v. 15). But that death is said to have reigned by the offense of one through one (tō tou henos paraptōmati... dia tou henos) is neither a tautology nor a pleonasm, as some seem to have supposed, who therefore preferred to read "by one offense through one" (heni paraptōmati dia henos; cf. variant readings). For Paul used this repetition, not necessary per se certainly, on account of the end which he pursues in this section, namely, so that by more clearly predicating the unity of the author of the kingdom of death he might conclude with greater force to the unity of the author of the kingdom of justice and life. For we have noted (above p. 271, 273) that he chiefly aimed at this in inserting this section (12-21): to illustrate by an example conceded by all with how much right all the goods of justice and glory are said to come to us through the one Christ. But by the same repetition the doctrine also concerning original sin, as previously expounded by the Apostle, is not a little confirmed. For since one and that one and the one offense are asserted to be the cause why death exercised universal dominion, therefore all die on account of that one and that one offense, it is altogether not understood how some modern non-Catholics (Weiss, etc.) persuade themselves that Paul teaches that the actual sins of individuals by which they have imitated the offense of Adam are the cause of their death. For if Weiss, to prove his error, notes (on v. 16), that the causal nexus which was established by God on the occasion of Adam's offense between sin and death brings about that all die on account of each one's actual sins, he does not note that Paul in this whole passage does not speak of the connection between sin in general and death, but of the connection between death and that one sin of the one Adam by which he transgressed the law sanctioned by the threat of death; indeed, that he expressly excluded such a universal connection between sin in general and death (vv. 13-14). All the posterity of Adam are subject to the dominion of death because they had some part in that one offense of the one Adam; therefore all are correctly said to die on account of each one's sin, and indeed on account of original sin contracted from Adam, not truly on account of actual sin committed by their own will.

The two members of the sentence do not seem to correspond to each other sufficiently harmoniously, so that it could have been written more accurately: "If by the offense of one death reigned through one, much more by the righteous deed of one (namely, the obedience of Christ) life will reign through one Jesus Christ in those who receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of justice." Nevertheless, Paul deliberately did not speak thus, because the kingdom of death (which is designated by the aorist ebasileusen [reigned] as finished, because it has already begun to be destroyed by the death and resurrection of Christ) relates differently from the future kingdom of life. For death as a tyrant exercises dominion over all so that it holds them subject to itself as unwilling slaves and no one can withdraw himself from it; but such a kingdom does not belong to life, for it does not dominate over the just as if it had subjected them to itself unwillingly, but reigns through the just, who, called, voluntarily follow grace and therefore, endowed with new life, obtain the kingdom itself in and with Christ. In the kingdom of death only death dominates, the rest are subject slaves; in the kingdom of life Christ indeed, who is true life, reigns, but also all the just, inasmuch as they are intimately united to the Lord and constitute with him one mystical person, are truly kings. Therefore Toledo correctly notes that by the diverse construction of the two members is shown "the dignity and excellence to which the grace of Christ has promoted us, that we ourselves reign and are kings."

But to this dignity only those will attain who receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of justice, which no one can receive except through that one, Jesus Christ, who by his death merited for us not only life and future glory, but also all the helps and means by which one arrives at it. These are designated in the Vulgate by three names: the abundance of grace and of the gift and of justice; but since the Apostle undoubtedly looks back to v. 15 (hē charis tou theou kai hē dōrea en chariti tēs tou... Christou eperisseusen: the grace of God and the gift which consists in the grace of Christ abounded), we prefer the customary Greek reading (cf. variant readings), with which also St. Irenaeus's interpreter (C. haer. III. 16,8) and St. Augustine (De pecc. merit. et rem. I. 13,17; Ad Hilar. epist. 157 n. 13, etc.) nearly agree (the abundance of grace and of justice; cf. tēn perisseian tēs charitos kai tēs dikaiosynēs). Therefore, by the name of grace here (as in v. 15) we judge that divine benevolence is signified, from which as from the first source emanates the gift of justice merited for us by the Lord and conferred on us, and at the same time all the gifts of glory which depend on justice.

With the differences which exist between the efficacy of the offense and the gift and their effects having been expounded (15-17), the Apostle returns to the similarity indicated in v. 12, so that by a more accurate explanation of it he may confirm that there is one author of justice and life from the conceded unity of the author of sin and death (18-19). Nor, however, is it correctly said that he nakedly resumes the comparison begun (v. 18) (cf. above p. 275 sq.), but progressing in his argumentation he now derives it as a legitimate conclusion (from v. 17): 18. Therefore (ara oun, because namely the just will reign through the one Christ, just as death reigned through the one Adam) just as through the offense of one (or less correctly: through one offense di' henos paraptōmatos) unto all men unto condemnation (eis katakrima), so also through the righteousness of one (or: righteous deed; or: through one righteous deed di' henos dikaiōmatos) unto all men unto justification of life (eis dikaiōsin zōēs). The sentence is again elliptical, but the former member is easily completed by inserting the aorist ēlthen (the matter resulted; cf. Phil. 1:19; Luke 21:13), the latter by the future eleusetai (the matter will result). But if some judge that the aorist should be supplied in both members, they do not sufficiently note that even in vv. 17 and 19, with which our sentence is most closely connected, different tenses are used in the former and in the latter members. Nor do we approve what others supply from v. 16 in the former to krima egeneto, in the latter to charisma egeneto (or eleusetai), since that is less apt and more far-fetched.

Furthermore, with the Vulgate quite a few modern non-Catholics also (Fritzsche, Tholuck, Philippi, Hofmann, Goebel, Lipsius, etc.) take the genitive henos (di' henos paraptōmatos, di' henos dikaiōmatos) as masculine (through the offense of one, etc.); and rightly so. For not only is the genitive taken in this sense throughout this whole section (cf. vv. 12, 15, 16, 17, 19), but also the discussion concerns not so much the unity of causes as of authors of the kingdom of death and the kingdom of life, and (what is of greater moment) our v. 18 is a conclusion from the premises proposed in v. 17, in which this unity of authors is chiefly asserted. That by the name dikaiōma (Vulgate: justice) a righteous deed is here designated is already clearly evident from the fact that it is directly opposed to paraptōma (offense), but more clearly from the fact that it is explained by the name hypakoē (obedience) in v. 19 (cf. on v. 16). Similarly, from the fact that katakrima (condemnation) and dikaiōsis zōēs (justification of life) are opposed to each other, it is legitimately gathered that katakrima signifies not so much a naked condemnatory sentence as condemnation handed over to execution, therefore the very penalty of death, and also of eternal death (cf. on v. 12), already inflicted; just as dikaiōsis zōēs is not an acquittal or justifying sentence, but the very conferral of justice which will provide true eternal life.

A certain difficulty exists in this: that it is not established whether the same or diverse extension is to be attributed to the expression pantes (all) in both members. There is no doubt that in the former the whole human race must be understood, i.e., all and individual persons who descend from Adam by natural generation (cf. above p. 275), and the same extension would have to be admitted in the latter if in our passage the discussion concerned only the sufficiency of the merits which Christ acquired for the human race by his obedience. For dying on the cross he paid a price more than sufficient to redeem all and individual men, and he paid it with serious intention so that all and individuals might obtain remission of all their sins and true justice. But the discussion here is not about the sufficiency of redemption but about its actual efficacy, which extends only to the faithful, namely, to those who, using the means which Christ instituted, are reborn from Christ; wherefore in the latter member the expression pantes must be limited to them. In this sense, well with the holy Fathers and most interpreters, Thomas says: "It must be understood that just as all men who are born carnally from Adam incur condemnation [of death] through his sin, so all who are reborn spiritually from Christ obtain [through his righteous deed, i.e., through his obedience] justification of life. Although it can be said that the justification of Christ passes unto the justification of all as to sufficiency, although as to efficacy it proceeds only to the faithful. But from this which is said here we must understand that just as no one dies except through the sin of Adam, so no one is justified except through the justice of Christ, which indeed is through faith in him (cf. above 3:22). But men believed in him not only those who are after his incarnation, but also those who preceded his incarnation; for just as we believe him to have been born and to have suffered, so they believed he would be born and would suffer. Whence our faith and theirs is the same" (cf. also Comment. in 1 Cor. p. 469 sq.). From this common interpretation and at the same time from the truth, unless I am mistaken, Toledo departs, who, attributing the same extension to the expression pantes in both members, understands justification of life as "the (divine) action by which justly on account of the justice of one (Christ) all are reborn to life" in the universal resurrection, just as "condemnation is the action by which all are justly handed over to death on account of the sin of one (Adam)." But how the universal resurrection can be called justification of life, I plainly do not see at all; nor do I see more what the commemoration of the resurrection of all, just and unjust, means in this context, where the discussion concerns the benefits conferred on the human race through Christ; for to the wicked resurrection is certainly not a benefit. But if Toledo says that their resurrection results in proof of Christ's glory, I will not contradict, but I judge it must be noted that the Apostle does not speak about those things which Christ merited for himself, but about his death salutary for us.

That our interpretation of the preceding sentence is genuine appears from the following, which Paul adds for the sake of explanation and at the same time confirmation. For he explains what offense (paraptōma) and what righteous deed (dikaiōma) was the cause both of the condemnation of all and of the justification of life, and at the same time shows with what right he could speak of condemnation and of justification providing life: 19. For just as through the disobedience of one man the many (hoi polloi) were constituted sinners (hamartōloi), so also through the obedience of one the many (hoi polloi) shall be constituted just (dikaioi). Therefore, he understood by the offense the disobedience of Adam transgressing the divine precept in paradise, on account of which the sentence of death was passed on him and his posterity (Gen. 3:17-19); but he understood by the righteous deed the death of Christ, who "having become obedient unto death, even death on a cross, healing the disobedience which had been done on the tree by the obedience which was on the tree" (St. Irenaeus, C. haer. V. 16,3) merited exaltation for himself, reconciliation and life for us (v. 10; 3:24 sqq.; Phil. 2:8 sqq., etc.). Furthermore, just as Adam's offense was also our offense, so Christ's obedience was at the same time our obedience. "In the first Adam," says St. Irenaeus (l.c.), "we offended God by not doing his precept; but in the second Adam we were reconciled to God, having been made obedient unto death." Truly in and with Adam those many (hoi polloi), i.e., all who descend from him by natural generation, transgressed the divine precept (v. 12), so that by that one offense all were truly and properly constituted sinners, with the guilt of fault contracted, and incurred the same condemnation of death which he did. But similarly in and with Christ those many (hoi polloi), i.e., all who are reborn from him and are inserted into him through faith and baptism as members to the head, undergo the death of the cross from obedience (cf. 6:3 sqq.), so that by this one righteous deed of Christ all who pertain to him are truly and properly constituted just, inasmuch as they are washed from sins and sanctified and justified (1 Cor. 6:11), and will reign in life through the one Jesus Christ (v. 17).

It must be carefully noted how by this sentence not only is the dogma concerning original sin expressed equally clearly and briefly (through the disobedience of one Adam all were constituted sinners), but at the same time the Protestant doctrine of imputed justice is repudiated. For all who pertain to Christ are said to be constituted just by the same manner by which all the posterity of Adam are constituted sinners; but the Protestants themselves deny that men are constituted sinners by the external imputation of Adamic sin; therefore neither can those who pertain to Christ be said to be constituted just by the external imputation of justice. Thomas Stapleton explains this excellently (Antidota in Acta Ap. et in epp. ad Rom. et binas ad Cor. Lyon 1595; in Rom. 5:18 sq.): "The whole disputation of the Apostle and especially this conclusion (vv. 18 sq.) most clearly demonstrates true and inherent justice imparted to us through Christ. For the Apostle says that just as through the offense and disobedience of one Adam all men were condemned and constituted sinners, so through the justice and obedience of one Christ all men obtained justification of life and were constituted just. But through Adam's offense all men were so constituted sinners that all propagated from him are truly and really born sinners, not through the imputation of Adam's disobedience but from true guilt inhering in individuals are sons of wrath (Eph. 2:3) and true sinners. This part of the comparison Beza in this passage acknowledges, writing that all men are born plainly guilty with fault contracted from the first parent. Therefore, if the Apostle's comparison is true, through the justice and obedience of one Christ all reborn in him were so constituted just that they have inherent justice and are truly and really just. To carnal propagation from Adam, through which guilt is not imputed but truly contracted, corresponds spiritual regeneration in Christ (which Beza denies is understood here by the Apostle, but which must necessarily be understood so that the comparison may be true and perfect), through which those who are regenerated are constituted just. For he gave them power to become sons of God, not merely to be reckoned or held as such, who were born of God (John 1:12), and again: see what love God has given us, that we should be called sons of God and be so (1 John 3:1). Wherefore just as through the disobedience of Adam we are called sinners and are so (not merely called or reckoned), so also through the obedience of Christ we are called just and are so, not merely called or reckoned. Therefore, to the guilt contracted through Adam truly inhering in individuals born from him corresponds the justice given through Christ, truly inhering in all reborn from him. On account of this inherent justice imparted to us by Christ's benefit, the Apostle says: the many shall be constituted just; he did not say: they shall be reckoned just." Cf. Beelen, Reithmayr, etc.

Just as through the one Adam sin and death, so through the one Christ justice and life: this thesis Paul has explained and demonstrated from v. 12 onward, but he would not have satisfied the readers of the epistle unless he had removed one doubt which seemed to remain. For in the intervening time between Adam's fall and the salutary death of Christ the Law had been divinely given, and it could rightly be asked whether the kingdom of sin and death had not already been destroyed by the Law or at least begun to be destroyed; and this could be asked all the more because the Apostle in his argumentation had himself indicated that a new period began from the Mosaic legislation (vv. 13-14) and had demonstrated the universality of the kingdom of sin from the pre-Mosaic state of affairs alone. Therefore, in order to show that his thesis was firm and certain in every respect, he also wished to explain what were the parts of the Law in the economy of salvation. But very briefly, because he was going to treat this question more fully later (7:7 sqq.), he teaches that sin was not deleted by the Law but increased, so that by this means the power of grace which is through Christ might shine forth more clearly. 20. But the Law entered in (pareisēlthen), that (hina) the offense might abound (to paraptōma); but where sin abounded (hē hamartia; with Fuldensis, etc., better: sin), grace superabounded.

CONTINUE