Verses 17-26 were translated using ChatGT; the remainder was done bu Claude.
The Theme of the Sermon on the Mount (5:17–20)
The office of the Apostles to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world presupposes a new revelation, one which is elevated above the previous revelation and destined for the whole world. From this one might have drawn the conclusion that the old Law had now been completely abolished. In order to oppose this supposition—which could easily become a reproach—and to make clear the relationship of the New Covenant to the Old, Jesus turns to His position with regard to the Old Testament, which He precisely defines in the following verses, and then gives the explanation and justification.
The Fathers bring forward two points for establishing the connection: the doubt of the disciples and the slanders to be expected from the Jews. The disciples could recognize in the task entrusted to them a contradiction to their former conceptions of the theocracy (Augustine, Op. imp.; Maldonatus), and on the other hand Jesus often had to go beyond the Jewish ritual laws and beyond the letter of others, indeed to establish directly new laws (Chrysostom). Jesus, however, now attaches Himself so closely to the Old Testament that many critics wish to remove verses 18 and 19 from the context as going too far. To this may indeed have contributed the invention of so-called tendency-criticism, namely that the ἐλάχιστος (“the least”) is the Apostle Paul, and that an anti-Pauline tendency betrays itself here (cf. 1 Cor 15:9; Eph 3:8), which even Weiss calls a “chilly fancy.” The saying does indeed sound very Jewish-conservative, but it loses this sharpness in part when λῦσαι (to destroy/abolish) and πληρῶσαι (to fulfill) are explained in a deeper spiritual sense.
The ordinances and prescriptions of the Old Testament are not simply removed, but their spiritual and ideal fulfillment takes their place. Insofar as they are typological, they have reached their end; insofar as they are moral, they are referred to another principle and developed to a higher significance. The seed which slumbered in the Old Testament unfolds into plant, blossom, and fruit. But since neither among the Jews nor among the disciples was the right understanding yet present, Jesus had first to emphasize the continuity more than the divergence in His announcement. He could not, as the Apostle Paul later does, regard the entire ritual law as adiaphoristic and set it aside, but had to adapt Himself to the understanding of His hearers and content Himself with interiorizing and deepening the fulfillment of the moral law, presupposing its binding force for the disciples.
A rebuke both of Pharisaical excesses and of the whole outward, lifeless Jewish law-observance protected by the letter of the Law was the necessary consequence. Chrysostom finds in this announcement almost a captatio benevolentiae:
κέχρηται ταύτῃ προδιορθώσει ἵνα μὴ ταράξῃ τὸ ξένον τῶν ἀκουόντων τὰς ψυχάς καὶ διστάζειν παρασκευάσῃ πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα
(“He makes use of this preliminary correction so that He may not disturb the souls of His hearers by what is foreign to them, and prepare them to hesitate with regard to what is said,” Hom. 16.1).
In general, Chrysostom explains the apparent fluctuation of the Lord in His relationship to the Law from a consideration for the Jews. At times He dissolved it, at times He observed it: the former to prepare the way for the future rule of life, the latter to close the shameless mouth of the Jews and to descend to their weakness. For the same reason the Apostles also later wavered for a long time.
Herein also lies the reason for the placing of this theme at the beginning of the entire discourse, and the reason why Matthew has taken up this theme and the whole sermon in such fullness. Jesus did not repel the Jews by abolishing the Law, but proved Himself to be the Messiah by recognizing it. But as Messiah He had to carry the Law forward: ἵνα καὶ τὸν νόμον εὐλόγως ἀναπαύσῃ καὶ μὴ πλήξῃ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους (“so that He might fittingly bring the Law to rest and not strike the Jews,” Euthymius and Chrysostom).
The two seemingly contradictory opinions—of the eternal duration of the Law (Baruch 4:1; Philo, Vita Mosis II, 656; Josephus Contra Apionem 2.38; Talmud; cf. Schöttgen I, 28) and of the new order of the Messiah (Isa 42:9; Jer 31:31; Ezek 36:26ff and some Talmud passages)—thus receive their most beautiful reconciliation.
Verse 17. ὁ νόμος is the Law given by God as it is presented in the Pentateuch, without a distinction between moral and ritual prescriptions. οἱ προφῆται designate the further Old Testament revelation insofar as it prepares the Messiah and His work. Thus ὁ νόμος and οἱ προφῆται together comprise the whole Old Testament. ἤ is not καί but is always used disjunctively; both members are thereby not only more sharply emphasized but also designated according to their characteristic peculiarity (Fritzsche; Winer).
Therefore one must follow the general interpretation of the Fathers (Hilary, Jerome, Op. imp., Bede, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Euthymius) and must not explain προφῆται as the continuation of the Law, but as the prophecies which were fulfilled in the life of the Lord. To be sure, then καταλῦσαι (to abolish) fits less well with προφῆται, since no one would have expected their abolition from the Messiah (Meyer), but the negation of the prophecies would nevertheless have amounted to a dissolution of the prophets.
καταλῦσαι = to dissolve, destroy, metaphorically to render ineffective; it is often used by the Greeks for the abolition of existing institutions, forms of government, and laws. πληρῶσαι = to fulfill, to make full, to complete. The fulfillment of the Law consists either in observing its prescriptions or in perfecting and completing it. Both meanings must here be maintained, since only from this does the use of the saying become intelligible. The Jews held to the first meaning; Jesus, however, shows in what follows the second, by spiritualizing the Law and freeing it from its narrow limitation to a single people. What was given only in shadow-outline, Jesus has expanded, supplemented, and brought to completion.
The fulfillment of the types and prophecies, which could not be separated from the strictly legal part of revelation, is self-evident without assigning another meaning to πληρῶσαι; for here too Jesus accomplished acts or accepted sufferings which, according to the counsel of God, were appointed for the Messiah. These also are therefore a revelation of the divine will.
Verse 18. ἀμήν (Hebrew אָמֵן, amen) means substantively “faithfulness,” adjectivally “faithful, firm,” adverbially ἀληθῶς (“truly, certainly,” Luke 9:27). The word was used by the Israelites to confirm covenant and oath (Num 5:22; Deut 27:15; Neh 5:13), and at the beginning (Jer 28:6) and end of speech or prayer. In the New Testament it is used as a formula of affirmation only by Jesus, and in John’s Gospel in double form (e.g., John 1:52; 3:3,5,19). The Apostles use it frequently in doxologies (Rom 1:25; 9:5; Gal 1:5; 1 Pet 4:11), and from synagogue usage it also passed into Christian churches as the congregation’s responsory (1 Cor 14:16).
παρέρχεσθαι (Hebrew עָבַר, ʿāvar, “to pass away”) = to pass away, to perish. ἕως ἂν παρέλθῃ = until it shall have passed away, i.e., until the end of the world. This does not mean that the Law then ceases; rather, in another form—as love and righteousness—it will also continue in the new world according to its ideal essence, just as heaven and earth do not perish in the strict sense but are transformed (Matt 24:35; 2 Pet 3:10; 1 John 2:17; 1 Cor 7:31).
ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ μία κεραία = not one iota or one little stroke. ἰῶτα is the smallest letter of the Hebrew alphabet; κεραία (from κέρας, “little horn”) is used by Greek grammarians for accents and diacritical marks. Matthew understands it of the small strokes by which similar Hebrew letters are distinguished from one another (e.g., ה and ד, ר and כ). By this Jesus means that even the smallest determinations of the Law are taken up into the New Covenant, insofar as by the inclusion of the whole, the individual part also, though in spiritualized form, continues, and the typological passes over into fulfillment.
One must not here distinguish between moral and ritual prescriptions, but just as little attempt to demonstrate the specific fulfillment of every single Old Testament regulation in the New Testament. That would be a misunderstanding of the time in which Jesus spoke and of the purpose for which Matthew reports the saying.
ἕως ἂν πάντα γένηται = until all shall have happened. Full fulfillment will occur only with the end of the world. Then the Law will continue as fulfilled, as love and righteousness. With the first ἕως more the external imperishability is expressed; here the inner, essential one.
Verse 19. λύειν in this context can only mean καταλύειν, to abolish, to set aside. The Fathers and older exegetes mostly take it this way; Augustine and Bede remain with this explanation demanded by the context. Much discussion follows concerning the apostolic teaching office and the relation to the Old Testament, concluding that this passage must indeed be understood of the messianic kingdom, in which the rank of the apostolic teacher depends on greater or lesser knowledge of the Law, though in a spiritualized, fulfilled sense.
Verse 20. δικαιοσύνη (righteousness) is to be taken generally, as in verse 6. The observance of the Law (observantia legis) is the foundation of righteousness, but it has its value in the spirit of love from which it proceeds and by which it is borne. Thus the transition to what follows is mediated. The Fathers rightly defended here both the holiness of the Old Testament and the exaltedness of the New. Jesus does not here define His position toward Pharisaic distortions, but toward the Old Law itself (Chrysostom), even if He sometimes uses the form in which the Law was taught by the Pharisees.
πλεῖον τῶν γραμματέων = a compressed comparison (comparatio compendiaria; Winer). περισσεύειν = to abound, to be present in superabundance.
The Fulfillment of the Law in the New Kingdom (5:21–48), continued
It has already been noted that Chrysostom, in the following specialization, finds the proof for the correct explanation of the general statement in verse 20. But since against this view stands the entire Protestant exegesis from Luther onward, in that it allows Jesus to set over against not the old Law itself but the Pharisaic statutes as the falsely interpreted old Law, as Maldonat says, spiritus enim sanctus illis opinor revelavit (“for I think the Holy Spirit revealed this to them”), we must enter more deeply into this question.
We maintain, first, that the explanation of the words decisively supports the former view, and second, that the Fathers without exception agree with it.
The explanation of the words must proceed from ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις (“it was said to the ancients”) and from the citation of the legal passages. The former could, in extremis, be translated “it was said by the ancients,” since the dative could be used ablatively (Winer §31.7, p. 203; Krüger §48.15.3), according to which the dative with the passive can be possessive when the concept is personal. But since in the New Testament with ἐρρέθη the dative is consistently used (Rom 9:12; 9:26; Gal 3:16; Rev 6:11; 9:4), and since in ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν (“but I say to you”) the ἐγώ corresponds to the logical subject of ἐρρέθη, namely Yahweh, who is intentionally not named because Jesus could not name either himself or the Father without causing offense, and since Chrysostom likewise requires the same relation for ἀρχαίοις, the proper dative must be accepted with the majority of exegetes.
Thus “the ancients” are the Jews to whom God gave the Law, or to whom Moses and his successors spoke. From this arises, even for Keil, the difficulty that ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω appears to form a contrast with the Law of Moses, and this appearance is strengthened by the fact that the Old Testament commandments are for the most part cited according to their wording in the Pentateuch. The attempt to remove this appearance by means of ἠκούσατε (“you have heard”) has not succeeded. It is interpreted thus: what was said to the ancients has been proclaimed to you by the scribes. Therefore Jesus is said to set his interpretation not against the Mosaic Law as such, but only against the Mosaic Law as proclaimed to the people by the scribes.
As if the Mosaic Law, when it is presented by the scribes according to its wording, had thereby become something different! Just as this explanation is mistaken, so also is Keil’s appeal to the Latin Fathers—Augustine, Jerome, Hilary, and others—incorrect. For Augustine rightly identifies Pharisaic righteousness with legal righteousness, and demands of believers a righteousness that goes beyond this, which does not rest content with the non occides (“you shall not kill”) of the Law. Moreover, he expressly states this in his Retractations. Jerome, however, apart from the fact that he also gives a second explanation, only at verse 20, with reference to what precedes, speaks of the traditiones of the Pharisees, qui contemptis mandatis Dei statuebant proprias traditiones (“who, despising the commandments of God, established their own traditions”), without applying this to what follows—which indeed could not be done, since nowhere in what follows is there any mention of a contempt of the commandments.
From another passage, already cited by Maldonat, it is entirely clear that Jerome assumes a contrast between old and new Law:
Tunc oculum pro oculo, nunc verberanti maxillam praebemus et alteram (5:38 ff.).
“Then: eye for eye; now: to the one who strikes we offer also the other cheek.”
He adds:
Haec dicimus non separantes legem et evangelium, ut Marcion calumniatur, sed unum atque eundem suscipientes Deum, qui pro varietate temporum atque causarum principium et finis serit, ut metat; plantat, ut habeat quod succidat; iacit fundamentum, ut aedificationi consummato saeculo culmen imponat.
“We say these things not separating Law and Gospel, as Marcion slanders us, but confessing one and the same God, who, according to the diversity of times and causes, sows in order to reap, plants in order to have what he may cut down, lays a foundation in order to place the summit on the building when the age is consummated.” (Ad Ageruchiam; cf. De monogamia, Ep. 11)
The Greeks express themselves no differently. With respect to Hilary, reference may be made to what was previously presented. He even goes further than the Greeks: Propositis igitur his quae in lege praescripta sunt, profectu ea, non abolitione, transgreditur (“Therefore, having set forth what is prescribed in the Law, he goes beyond them by progress, not by abolition”).
Among the other Latins I mention only the Opus imperfectum. Thus it should be considered proven that the Fathers are wrongly invoked in support of the opposite view, but also that they by no means indulge in antinomianism. How one can find in this explanation of the Fathers a contradiction to the divine Law itself, as Meyer, Wichelhaus, and others do, is incomprehensible to me. For not only do they explicitly defend themselves against Marcion and others against such a separation between Old and New Testaments, but they also emphasize the intimate kinship of both.
Chrysostom uses the example of a pupil whom the teacher leads from spelling to higher learning:
σὺ δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ συγχεῖν τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἐντολῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας ἄρξασθαι πρώτης, ἀφ’ ἧς καὶ ὁ νόμος ἤρξατο· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο δεικνύντος ἐστὶ τὴν συμφωνίαν.
“And you must also not confuse the order of the commandments, but begin from the former, the first, from which the Law itself began; for this too shows their harmony.” (cf. Epiphanius, Haer. 33.11)
Protestant exegetes turn this difference between the first form and its development, between the seed and the fully grown plant, into an irreconcilable opposition, and then of course can no longer accept any contrast between old and new Law.
It is not essentially different from μωρέ (mōre, “fool”). Opus imperfectum: quantum ad sensum verbi unum est dicere Fatue et Racha (“as far as the sense of the word is concerned, it is the same to say ‘fool’ and ‘Racha’”). Yet the latter denotes more a lack of intellect, the former more a lack of good manners. Compare James 2:20 and κενόκρανος (kenókranos, “empty-headed”) in the Sibylline Oracles 3, p. 418.
The Sanhedrin (cf. on 2:4) could pronounce a qualified death penalty. Yet it is probable that this right was restricted by the Romans, and that the verdict first had to be confirmed by the procurator (Schürer, p. 413 ff.). μωρέ is the translation of נָבָל (nābāl, “fool,” in the sense of “godless person”), Psalm 14:1; Sirach 50:28.
εἰς indicates motion toward. Otherwise it does not occur with ἔνοχος, yet similar brachyological constructions are not uncommon (Winer §31.5, p. 200; Krüger §62.3.1 ff.; Justin, Apology I.16). The expression ἔνοχος εἰς τὸ πῦρ γέεννα (“liable to the fire of Gehenna”) occurs only in the New Testament, but is already found very frequently in the oldest Targums (Jonathan on 1 Sam 2:8 f.; 2 Sam 26:15, and others; cf. Langen, loc. cit., p. 514).
In the Old Testament there is mention of בֵּן־הִנֹּם (Ben-Hinnom) (Josh 15:8; 18:16; 2 Chron 33:6), or גֵּיא בֶן־הִנֹּם (Gē ben-Hinnom) (2 Chron 28:3; Jer 7:32; 19:2, 6; 2 Kings 23:10; cf. Neh 11:30), a valley on the south and east side of Jerusalem, in which the idolatrous Jews in the time of Ahaz sacrificed children to Molech (1 Kings 11:7; 2 Kings 17:17; 2 Chron 28:3; Jer 7 and elsewhere).
Josiah eradicated this idolatrous worship and defiled the cult-site of the valley in order to prevent the sacrifice of children (2 Kings 23:10; cf. Jer 7:32). The corpses of the executed and the carcasses of animals were thrown into it, so that the place was avoided and abhorred, and the name was transferred to the place of the damned (Lightfoot, Schöttgen, Robinson, Langen). τοῦ πυρός (“of fire”) was added either because the damned are in a place of fire (Isa 66:24; Mark 9:43, 48; Luke 16:24), or because in the valley of Gehenna a continual fire was maintained in order to destroy the corpses (Hengstenberg; Dillmann; Book of Enoch).
In Chaldean the word is בְּהִנָּם (Be-Hinnam), Greek γέεννα (Gehenna). According to the usual explanation, it means “Valley of Hinnom” or “of the sons of the son of Hinnom,” but this is now largely abandoned, and הִנֹּם (Hinnom) is taken as an appellative meaning “wailing, lamentation” (cf. Hitzig and Graf on Jer 7:31; Gesenius and Grimm, Lexicon). Thus γέεννα would mean vallis lamentationis (“valley of lamentation”), from the wailing of the sacrificed children—an interpretation that fits the later usage of the word very well, even if it was originally probably a proper name.
Here γέεννα is used of hell, as always in the New Testament, where it occurs in the Synoptics and in James.
The progression corresponds to the three kinds of Jewish death penalty: simple execution; qualified death penalty by stoning or hanging; and execution with the handing over of the sinner to hell. Thus, if not in a strictly systematic, yet in a rhetorical manner, the varying punishability of anger and its outbursts is determined. Of punishment by earthly courts, of course, no thought is to be entertained.
Nor may one explain anger merely in relation to murder as a preparatory stage, although this gave the occasion for the discussion (Maldonat, Tholuck). For the general statement πᾶς ὁ ὀργιζόμενος (“everyone who is angry”) must also be taken generally, and the proper relation to murder is only that already discussed by the Fathers: that by the prohibition of anger, the ground of murder is removed.
Verse 23. If anger is generally forbidden, then a person must strive to avoid or remove every occasion for it as much as possible. This is especially necessary for one who, by bringing an offering, wishes to appease the anger of God or to gain God’s favor.
ἐὰν προσφέρης (“if you bring your offering”) refers to bringing the sacrificial gift to the altar (Lev 2:1). By this are meant the preparations for the sacrifice—the bringing of the sacrificial animal before the altar, etc.—for the placing of the offering on the altar was the task of the priest (Lev 1:3–4; 4:17; 6:1 ff.).
δῶρον (dōron, “gift”) is in general any sacrificial offering (8:4; 15:5; 23:18; Heb 5:1; 8:3). In the LXX it stands for מִנְחָה (minḥāh), קָרְבָּן (qorbān), and שֹׁחַד (šōḥad).
Verse 24. πρῶτον (“first of all”) is better connected with ὕπαγε (“go”) than with what follows, as Chrysostom holds, since in this the lofty demand of the Lord is recognized—that one should even leave the altar first.
From the context it is to be assumed that the brother has a justified ground for anger and complaint against the one who brings his offering (Mark 11:25; Rev 2:4; 14:20).
διαλλάγηθι (“be reconciled”) does not decide that the offerer is the offended party, unless one wishes to assume that reconciliation does not lie in the power of the offender but only of the offended. Jesus leaves this entirely aside. The offender is to do all that lies in his power to bring about reconciliation; about the success he need not concern himself further. But since Jesus here speaks of the law of love and reconciliation, he also demands from the offended party a conciliatory reception of the repentant offender, and even an initiative on his part. In this the sublimity of the new Law over the old is shown in the most beautiful light, but also in sharp contrast to the inclinations of natural humanity, to which the old Law at least had to make some concession.
The difficulty of the passage diminishes somewhat when one considers the figurative character of the discourse, which Augustine strongly emphasizes. The image is taken from Jewish sacrificial worship. But just as little as this was intended to be recognized as continuing, just so little could Jesus be referring only to external sacrifices and always demanding such an external act. Above all, reconciliation is necessary when one approaches the Eucharistic sacrifice; but even the uninitiated (οἱ ἀμύητοι) are to hear the admonition, since they too bring gifts and sacrifices, namely prayer and almsgiving.
If the brother is not present when we wish to bring sacrifice in the temple of our heart, we must first form the resolve to ask forgiveness of the offended brother—pergendum non pedibus corporis sed motibus animi (“one must go not with the feet of the body but with the movements of the soul”), Augustine. But if he is present, then external reconciliation must be accompanied by reconciliation with God—si hoc prius coram Deo feceris (“if you have first done this before God”), Augustine.
Verse 25. The second σε παραδῷ (“hand you over”) is lacking in א and B, in minuscules, and in the Fathers (Lachmann, Tischendorf). It could indeed have been omitted as superfluous (Meyer), but it is more probable that it was added for completion.
εὐνοεῖν occurs only here in the New Testament, meaning “to be well-disposed, conciliatory toward someone.” ὁ ἀντίδικος (“the adversary”) is, according to the context, the one who has something against the offerer (Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Opus imperfectum).
Before the Jewish court, the accuser could appear only together with the accused (Deut 21:18 ff.; 25:1), or the complaint would not be accepted. Under Roman law, the accuser could drag his opponent before court with his own hand. Once the defendant stood before the court, there was no longer any prospect of reconciliation, since then the formal judicial procedure began.
Therefore ἕως ὅτου (“until”) means: so long as still. Because a possible case is assumed, one might expect the subjunctive; but the indicative is chosen because the saying contains a general maxim (Winer §41.3, p. 278, note 2). The inclination toward reconciliation should arise quickly and last as long as one is still on the way.
ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ (“on the way”) is the way to the judge. βληθήσῃ (“you will be thrown”) can still depend on μήποτε (“lest”), or be taken independently, which makes it more emphatic (Winer §56.2, p. 468).
The adversary is the offended party; the way is this present life, especially its last period; the judge is God; the officer (πράκτωρ) is an angel, since angels are executors of the divine will (2 Thess 1:7; cf. 1 Thess 4:16; Matt 13:41 f., 49 f.); the prison (φυλακή) is Gehenna. Once the matter has come before the judge, an inexorable and irrevocable sentence is pronounced (Chrysostom).
Theophylact and Euthymius understand this warning of the earthly court and find it prudent on the part of the debtor to come to terms with his creditor before the matter becomes pending in court, because he would then preserve his freedom even if he lost his property. But such a prudential measure is completely disharmonious with the lofty subject of the solemn discourse. Jesus wishes to prove the necessity of speedy reconciliation to which he has just exhorted, and not—ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑψηλοτέρων ἐνέτρεψε καὶ τῶν μελλόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ φοβεῖ—to terrify both by what is higher and future and by what is fearful in the present life (Chrysostom). Even as an argumentatio ad hominem (Weiss), the meaning would be weakened. The only thing insignificant is that the comparison is drawn from judicial practice.
Verse 26. The condemned person can no longer be freed at all, since the removal of the debt of sin in this state is an impossibility. ἕως ἂν (“until”) gives a terminus that is never reached. The passage therefore can be invoked neither for purgatory nor for an ἀποκατάστασις πάντων (apokatastasis pantōn, “restoration of all”).
But Keil wrongly ascribes the former interpretation to Catholic exegetes in general. For already Maldonat appeals to St. Augustine for the sentence: nos non exituros postea sed nunquam exituros, quia qui in inferno sunt cum semper debitas poenas solvant, quia pro quolibet mortali peccato infinitas poenas debent, nunquam persolvunt (“we shall not go out afterward, but shall never go out, because those who are in hell, although they always pay the penalties owed, since for each mortal sin they owe infinite penalties, never fully pay them”).
The Latin Fathers are all for Gehenna; the Greek Fathers in any case understand the passage essentially differently, and only isolated exegetes are for purgatory (Berlepsch; Cornelius a Lapide: purgatorium et infernum).
κοδράντης (kodrantēs, “quadrans”) is about a penny. It is 1/4 of an as in copper, or 2 λεπτά (lepta) (Mark 12:42). The as among the Rabbis is אִסָּר (issar), which earlier had a th sound. In imperial times it weighed 1/4 ounce; the quadrans 2–4? about 2.1 grams (Marquardt, Römische Altertümer III.2, p. 22; Keil, p. 613), so that it approximately corresponded to our penny.
2. The Prohibition of Adultery and Divorce (27-32)
Jesus follows in his speech the order of the Decalogue, as also in 19:18, while otherwise in the New Testament the sequence between the 5th and 6th commandments is not strictly maintained (Luke 19:20, Rom 13:9, James 2:11). As with the fifth commandment, he also goes here from the letter of the law to a deeper spiritual understanding. While the law punished adultery as an external act, in the new kingdom even sinful desire is to be regarded as equivalent to adultery. The manner of execution is also quite analogous. Just as anger is the mother of murder, so desire is the mother of adultery. Thus, just as anger had to be forbidden for the spiritual fulfillment of the commandment against murder, so desire must be forbidden to prevent adultery (Op. imp.). Only here the punishment is lacking, and in the second part cause and effect are not kept strictly separate. Here it is quite evident how little the appeal to Pharisaic tradition alone suffices. For in Exodus 20:14 it simply says "thou shalt not commit adultery" (οὐ μοιχεύσεις), as in our passage. But if one adduces the Lord's following exposition as proof of the false understanding of the Jews or Pharisees (Meyer, Keil), this is precisely a petitio principii.
V. 27 ἀρχαίοις - the received reading is to be deleted.
V. 28 γυναῖκα - a woman generally, a female person, for the βλέπων (one who looks) is thought of as a husband, since βλέπειν is opposed to μοιχεύειν. πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι - "in order to desire her." αὐτήν is to be retained according to B D A and others, Theophylact once, Origen, Eusebius, Lachmann. Elzevir has αὐτῆς according to & M Justin, Athenaeum once, Origen, It, Vulgate; some have no pronoun at all (236 א Clement, Origen, Chrysostom, Isidore, Tertullian, Fritzsche, Tischendorf). Since πρός with the infinitive denotes purpose (eo consilio ut; cf. Wilke, Grimm s.v., Fritzsche ad loc., Krüger 50.6.2), Euthymius explains: "that is, one who looks inquisitively, one who looks passionately so as to desire intercourse." Thus it is not the unintentional glance, nor the glance that leads to arousal of desire, but rather the glance accompanied by desire that from the outset aims at satisfying lust. However, the awakening of lust as a result of seeing is not excluded, and therefore even from accidental seeing a sin can arise if the will does not fight against it in time. That lustful gazing, even when no direct desire is connected with it, is forbidden goes without saying, for it must awaken and maintain the impure fire of the heart, and here desire is forbidden not merely because it can lead to the act, but because it is a spiritual act. The desire need not manifest itself externally so that "he desired her," for this would already characterize the βλέπειν as the first step toward seduction.
If in the Old Testament it is expressly forbidden to desire one's neighbor's wife - "thou shalt not desire thy neighbor's wife" (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ πλησίον σου, Exod 20:17) - this prohibition, as the wording already shows, had more the social family interest as its purpose, while the Lord generally imposes the "thou shalt not desire" as a moral duty. μοιχεύειν τινα - "to commit adultery with someone" - occurs with both married and unmarried women. In the law and among the Greeks, however, it is always used of the seduction of another man's wife, since according to ancient views only the rights of the man, but not those of the woman, could be violated (Deut 5:18, Lev 20:10, Plato Rep. 2.360B, and generally Luc. de mar. 12.1).
V. 29-30 In order that this strict requirement be fulfilled, great self-denial is necessary, which sacrifices even the dearest earthly goods in order not to fall into eternal judgment. The similes are to be explained as such and not taken literally, even though ὀφθαλμός refers directly back to βλέπειν. δεξιός and δεξιά are added because according to popular view the right members have preference (Exod 29:20, 1 Sam 11:2, Zech 11:17; already in Homer, cf. Passow s.v.). But the addition demands precisely in the case of the eye a figurative explanation, since the glance is common to both eyes (Hilary, Op. imp.), and shows that in general every use of a member for fulfilling a desire is sinful, so that by plucking out one or the other, lustfulness is not eliminated.
The preservation of spiritual life is as great a duty as that of the body, and just as for this purpose, when it becomes necessary, individual members are sacrificed, so for the higher good analogous sacrifices may not be refused. But since this purpose can be achieved without mutilation of the body, the necessity of figurative understanding also becomes clear from the comparison. Admittedly, this purpose is also achieved with the literal understanding if one adds "rather than let yourself be carried away to sin by it" (Arnoldi) or "si fieri posset aut liceret" (Maldonatus) or "sed scandalum aliter semper vitari potest, membra scilicet non eruendo vel abscindendo, sed a suis operibus continendo" (Jansenius junior), but these restrictions lead precisely to the figurative understanding. C. a Lapide: "proprie, sed ita ut parabolae subserviat et parabolice explicetur," which is also not made impossible by σῶμα, for this figuratively means the whole personality, which one hurts by sacrificing loved and revered objects just as one hurts the body by cutting off individual members.
The Fathers generally embrace the figurative explanation, interpreting eye and hand as one's dearest relatives, children, spouses, etc. (Hilary, Athanasius, Cyril, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Euthymius), or of the passions (Jerome), or of mind and will (Op. imp.). Augustine might perhaps be cited in the explanation of v. 29 for the literal understanding: "the eye, what is vehemently loved; what is added, 'right,' to increase the force of affection." But the explanation of v. 30 leaves no doubt about the parabolic understanding: "the eye, most beloved friend, counselor."
σκανδαλίζειν corresponds to the Hebrew כָשַׁל "to stumble, take offense"; it does not occur among the Greeks; among the LXX first in Sir 9:5, 23:8, 35:15, and properly means to lay a trap (σκάνδαλον, σκανδάλη, σκανδάληθρον - the crooked stick in the trap on which the bait sits and which, touched by the animal, snaps the trap shut) to catch someone in it, but is always used metaphorically in the New Testament to seduce, not merely to irritate. Since Luther it is commonly translated with "to offend." συμφέρει σοι - "it is advantageous to you." ἵνα is not used τελικῶς but to paraphrase the infinitive (Winer 44.8, p. 314). Instead of βληθῇ in v. 30, ἀπέλθῃ should be read (& B D Min It Vulg Lachmann Tischendorf); the former is conformed to v. 29.
V. 31-32 According to Deut 24:1, the man was permitted to dismiss his wife if he found something shameful in her (עֶרְוַת דָּבָר, ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα), only he had to give her a certificate of divorce that served her for legitimation in case of remarriage. But if she had married another, she could no longer be taken back by the first husband. Since the concept of "ugly" or "shameful" is very elastic, it received various interpretations and especially later offered a convenient means to dismiss the wife for the slightest reasons. For neither did a reason have to be stated in the certificate of divorce, nor did judicial proceedings take place.
However, the purpose of the law was not this. For Moses found divorce as a custom and did not command it but only permitted it and restricted it through the obligation to issue a certificate of divorce (Augustine ad loc. and c. Faust. 19.26). Through divorce from an unhappy marriage, the wife, given the well-known hardheartedness of the Jews, was often freed from a torturous cohabitation—according to the view of most Fathers, from the danger of death. By prohibiting reconciliation after separation, following the remarriage of the repudiated wife, through a certificate of divorce or the death of the husband, an all too facile divorce was further prevented.
Thus for understanding the whole passage it must be noted that: (1) it concerns not a positive law but a mitigation of it occasioned by circumstances, and (2) that the imperfect law of the old covenant is contrasted with the perfect law of the new covenant. From this it follows that in the New Testament the mitigation as a concession to sinfulness is abolished, and the law must be restored to its ideal content already intended by the Creator.
Through the dismissal of the wife not only was the idea of marriage violated, but the wife was also exposed to danger and, given the well-known prejudice of the Jews against the unmarried state, forced to remarry. Now when Jesus quite generally designates this as adultery, he demands a perfect observance of the prohibition "thou shalt not commit adultery" corresponding to the idea of marriage. For that the second clause of v. 32 (καὶ ὃς ἐὰν κτλ.) is to be understood quite generally can only be denied from a partisan standpoint, given the general formulation, as even Weiss and Keil admit against Meyer.
The exception posited by the latter, that ἀπολελυμένην means one unlawfully dismissed, thus not for adultery, would have been self-evident from the first half-verse and would only be permissible if in the first half-verse the obligation to dismiss and not merely the permission were given. Augustine: "he compels retention of the wife if there is no cause of fornication; but if there is, he does not compel dismissal but permits it." Through this an adulterous wife would be distinguished before others, in that she not only escaped an inconvenient cohabitation but could also enter into a new marriage without guilt.
Through adultery the marriage is indeed damaged in its innermost essence, but it is not destroyed—otherwise the separation would have to be prescribed for this case. Against this it cannot be objected (C. a Lapide) that the marriages of the divorced among the Jews would have been adulterous unions, for we may not apply Christ's law retroactively. In and of itself this would indeed have been the case if the same high moral demands had been made, which many in fact presuppose (cf. Loch on Deut 24:4), but the Fathers always regarded this concession as an evil, albeit the lesser one.
For this understanding all parallel passages speak quite decidedly (Mark 10:2ff, Luke 16:18, 1 Cor 7:39, Rom 7:2-3), in which generally the remarriage of a spouse during the lifetime of the other is designated as adultery. Also the expression πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων instead of ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ according to & B Min Verss Lachmann Tischendorf, which is probably conformed less to vv. 22, 28 (Meyer) than the received text to v. 31, is not contrary to this, for that ἀπολύειν is always used of divorce could only be asserted from the Jewish standpoint and is refuted in our passage by ἀπολελυμένη, which exegetes of all directions explain as a dismissed woman who is still a wife. Thus ἀπολύειν must have a different meaning in the Lord's mouth, even if among the Jews only actual divorce could be thought of.
The consequence of this statement would be the prohibition of any separation except through death. However, as much as Jesus restricts Moses' concession, he does allow an exception by adding παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας. παρεκτός among the Greeks (παρέκ, παρέξ) occurs only in Acts 26:29, Test. XII Patr. p. 631, Geopon. 13.15.7, Etymol. M. p. 652.18 as a preposition with the genitive meaning "except, with the exception of," and as an adverb with the article τὰ παρεκτός sc. γινόμενα (2 Cor 11:28).
λόγος "reason, ground" is also found in Acts 10:29 and often in the classical writers. Euthymius: δίχα αἰτίας πορνείας "without cause of fornication," but in connection with a genitive it cannot be demonstrated; therefore the expression is best explained according to the Hebrew and λόγος is taken generally as causa "cause, matter, or affair" (מִלְבַד דָבָר Delitzsch, Schegg, Guillemard, Schürer, Grimm; Eccl 2:25, חוּץ מִן LXX πάρεξ αὐτοῦ, Wünsche p. 56).
πορνεία can in any case not be taken in the figurative sense of idolatry, as זְנוּת and תַּזְנוּת are regularly used and זְנוּנִים partly in the Old Testament, or generally of any vice (Augustine ad loc., restricted in Retract. 1.19.6). Secondly, πορνεία may not be explained as unchastity before marriage (Graz, Döllinger), because the whole context deals only with conduct in marriage and also the certificate of divorce presupposes a lawful marriage. Thereby the third explanation is also excluded, of a property of the wife that makes the marriage invalid—blood relationship, etc. (Patrizi, Schegg, Aberle). This also cannot be maintained by appeal to the Hebrew עֶרְוָה, which is used in the law as the standing designation of a forbidden marriage (Lev 18:6 and elsewhere), for עֶרְוָה means nakedness, shame, and to uncover this of a close relative is indeed forbidden by law, but does not change the meaning of the word. In Deut 24:1, however, עֶרְוָה can surely only designate something ugly in general (cf. 23:15), because otherwise there would have been no concession but an obligation, and also the two schools of Shammai and Hillel did not think of that. Individual late rabbinic passages can have even less probative force since they do not fit our special case at all.
In 1 Cor 5:1, πορνεία must naturally stand for incest because it concerns unchastity and not a real marriage, although ἔχειν is used, for who would give the name marriage to the forbidden cohabitation such as did not even occur among the pagans? In Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25, πορνεία is surely not self-evidently an unlawful marriage. This does not even fully apply to the relevant Noachian commandment; the prohibitions of Acts, however, have only a very distant similarity to those and must not be judged from the standpoint of the Old Testament. When one learns from the Pauline epistles how often the Apostle had to fight against the relapse of the Gentile Christians into all kinds of impurity, one is not surprised that πορνεία (venus illicita), which gave offense to the Jewish Christians, was included among the prohibitions of the Apostolic Council.
Also, fourthly, it is impossible with Dreher (Katholik 1877, 12, pp. 578ff) to explain παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας as "not to speak of fornication" or "the fornication business shall be, while I say this, left out of discussion." For this explanation would not only destroy the purely anti-Pharisaic character of the Sermon on the Mount but would also simply ignore Deuteronomy.
Therefore, fifthly, πορνεία according to the whole context can only be understood of unchastity in marriage, thus of adultery alone. That πορνεία and πορνεύειν are used in the New Testament in this way can only be documented by John 8:41, but it is found in the LXX Sir 26:12 and πορνεύειν Amos 7:17, Hos 3:3, and all the Fathers without exception understand the word as adulterium. Chrysostom: ἰδοὺ γὰρ καὶ ἕτερον δείκνυσιν ἡμῖν πάλιν μοιχείας εἶδος "for behold, he shows us again another form of adultery." Euthymius: πορνείαν ἐνταῦθα τὴν μοιχείαν ὀνομάσας "naming here fornication as adultery." Hilary: prostituta uxor "prostituted wife." Augustine: "how far all understand, i.e., that we believe that fornication is meant which is committed in debauchery."
But that Jesus chose πορνεία instead of the specific μοιχεία—whereby we initially leave aside the Aramaic language—can have its reason either in the fact that in v. 18 μοιχεύειν was also used for adultery in thought and here the carnal mixing is specifically designated (Weiss), or the sinful character was to be emphasized (Keil).
The verse thus means: Everyone who dismisses his wife, except in the case of unchastity/adultery, causes her to commit adultery. Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles read μοιχευθῆναι according to א B D, which could, however, be a gloss according to the following μοιχᾶται (Meyer). For in the case of adultery she has obviously already broken the marriage.
Thus nothing else remains but to return to the old opinion of separatio a thoro et mensa (separation from bed and board), which is expressed as clearly as possible in 1 Cor 7:11 and on which St. Augustine (de Serm. 1.16.43) emphatically relies. The objection that the Jews and ancient peoples in general knew nothing of such a separation is without any significance, for otherwise much in the New Testament would have to be designated as impractical. One may even go further and assert that the Jews and even the disciples at that time could only understand the Lord as permitting remarriage for this case. This will also be the reason why Matthew included the addition. The pagans did not take adultery and unchastity in general seriously; therefore such an addition could easily have given occasion for misunderstandings or even frivolities, which is why we find no mention of this concession in the Gospels and letters directed ad gentes.
The Jews, among whom the death penalty stood for adultery, could not imagine at all a continuation of marriage after adultery by the wife, and to that extent Schegg is right who explains the exception through the death penalty placed on adultery, so that at least ideally—since the death penalty was no longer carried out—in this case the marriage was dissolved only by death. But through this fiction alone the difficulty cannot be solved. Factually it was different—so what is the purpose of the addition? Grimm (Einheit p. 316) properly emphasizes the other moment but for his part goes to the other extreme when he sees in πορνεία a real ground for divorce that the Savior still conceded for Israel but not for the rest of the world. Rather, one must say it was a causa desinendi a coniugio (cause for ceasing from marriage) (Hilary) but not a causa divortii (cause for divorce). The Jewish marriage relationships are already taken into account by the mere application to the husband.
This explanation is in any case to be preferred to that of some Protestants (Bleek, Keim, Weiss) that the addition is not original. That a reunion of the spouses is permitted, indeed desired, follows from the explanation of ἀπολελυμένη already given above. A taking back of the wife would only be forbidden if the marriage were really dissolved and an internal reason existed. The Mosaic law decided only the case in which the dismissed woman had remarried, but by citing defilement as the ground for the prohibition of reunion, it leaves it open for the other case. From the strictly Jewish standpoint this admittedly has no reference to adultery because the death penalty stood for this. If this was no longer executed, then the defilement was already present before the dismissal, and to that extent Hilarius is right when he says "prescribing no other cause for ceasing from marriage than that which would defile the husband through association with a prostituted wife," only one must not seek in this an approval of the Oriental custom (R. Simon, princ. comm. p. 128) but rather the right of the spouse to refuse continuation of the marriage.
One must not overlook that the Christian law proceeds from external pollution to spiritual damage, and since this can be made good through repentance and penance, an external reunion is again possible and permissible. This explanation has ecclesiastical testimonies from the earliest times at its side. Already the Pastor of Hermas says (Mand. IV 1.5ff) that if the husband knows of the wife's adultery and she does not repent of her sin but persists in it, he should dismiss her but remain single himself; but if after the dismissal he marries another, he commits adultery. In the case of the dismissed woman's repentance, she should be taken back by the husband; if this does not happen, the spouse sins and loads a great guilt upon himself (cf. Justin, Apol. 1.15; Athenagoras, leg. 33; Theophilus, ad Autol. 3.13).
The latter, admittedly, Tertullian considers a favoring of adultery and is therefore not well disposed toward the writing of the Pastor, "which alone loves adulterers" (de pudic. c. 10), but his Montanist standpoint bears the main blame for this. Even Origen (to Matt 19:8, Huet I 363, Delar. III 639) explains it according to 1 Cor 7:39 as an offense against Scripture when church authorities permit a woman to remarry during her husband's lifetime, and knows only one excuse for it: that they wanted to prevent worse things. Despite the fact that he speaks of a διαλύειν γάμους ἐπὶ μόνῃ πορνείᾳ (dissolving marriages only for fornication), he nevertheless afterwards establishes the general principle: ὥσπερ δὲ μοιχαλίς ἐστι γυνή κἂν δοκῇ γαμεῖσθαι ἀνδρί ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ προτέρου οὕτως καὶ ἀνὴρ δοκῶν γαμεῖν ἀπολελυμένην οὐ γαμεῖ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἀπόφασιν ὅσον μοιχεύει "just as a woman is an adulteress, even if she seems to marry a man while the former still lives, so also a man who seems to marry a dismissed woman does not marry according to our Savior's declaration, but commits adultery."
This is also—some fluctuations aside—the general ecclesiastical-dogmatic standpoint already of the fourth century among Greeks and Latins (cf. "Marriage and Marriage Ceremony in the Fourth Century," Historisch-politische Blätter 1877, 9, pp. 677-96; Oswald, Sacramentenlehre 3rd ed. 1870, II, pp. 439ff). They indeed find in adultery the ground for dismissal (ἄφεσις, ἐκβάλλειν—Chrysostom), but consider every remarriage invalid. That a different practice nevertheless developed in the Greek Church has its ground in good part in the state legislation.
The Prohibition of Oaths (33-37)
V. 33 The first part of the prohibition does not stand literally in the law but is a consequence drawn from the second commandment (Lev 19:12, Exod 20:7). The second part is from Num 30:3 and Deut 23:21. By placing the emphasis on τῷ κυρίῳ ("to the Lord"), the Rabbis established the canon that an oath only takes place when the divine name itself appears in the formula. What is not sworn under invocation of the divine name is not an oath but merely a promise (cf. 23:16ff, Lightfoot, Wünsche, Philo de spec. legg. p. 770). ὅρκος here is what is vowed by the oath.
V. 34-36 Jesus places a higher demand by forbidding not only perjury but the oath in general, and declaring every kind of swearing to be an oath. For ὅλως (παντελῶς, "at all") can hardly be understood otherwise than of the oath in general, thus also and indeed principally of the oath sworn by God himself, who is therefore no longer mentioned in what follows. Admittedly, one could consider the following oaths a specification of μὴ ὀμόσαι ("not to swear") since μήτε and not μηδέ follows (Winer 55.6, p. 454), but this difference is also not strictly maintained elsewhere (Winer l.c. and Krüger 69.50.53), and the broader conception would not correspond to Jesus' deep understanding of the law. In the preceding commandments not only is the thing itself maintained but also everything that can be regarded as preparation for sin is forbidden. Accordingly, here too the prohibition must be understood not merely of perjury but of the oath in general, because it can easily lead to perjury.
Against his usual custom, he here gives the reasons for the prohibition. Some Fathers (Justin, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Chrysostom, Hilary, Jerome) have therefore declared every oath inadmissible, but even if this is correct for the ideal state of the Messianic kingdom of which the Lord speaks, the oath can nevertheless become a downright necessity in actual circumstances before the consummation, since only the wicked would draw advantage from its refusal. Thus God already swore in the Old Testament (Gen 22:16, 26:3, Num 14:23, Isa 45:23, Luke 1:73, Acts 7:17, Heb 6:13). Christ himself accepts an oath (Matt 26:63f), and the Apostle Paul likewise does not avoid it (Rom 1:9, 2 Cor 1:23, 11:31, Gal 1:20, Phil 1:8). But that the oath must be restricted to what is most necessary follows from this of itself.
Swearing by heaven, earth, etc., occurred frequently among the Jews (cf. Maimonides, Constit. de periur. c. 12.3, Lightfoot, Wetstein, Schöttgen, Wünsche). Individual such oaths are already found in the Old Testament (Gen 42:15, 1 Sam 1:26, 20:3, 2 Sam 11:11, 2 Kings 2:2). The verbs of swearing are construed in Greek with the accusative or κατά τινος (Krüger 46.6.4, 68.24); in the New Testament ἐν and εἰς are formed after the Hebrew נִשְׁבַּע בְּ, but the accusative also stands (James 5:12) and κατά (Heb 6:13, 16; Winer 31.1, p. 209).
ὅτι οὐ δύνασαι ("because you cannot") - since you cannot make a single hair white or black. It is neither the production nor the dyeing of the hair that is meant, but the color of the hair in youth and old age, over which man can exert not the slightest influence.
V. 37 In the true kingdom of Christ no oath is necessary because the simple yes and no suffices for everyone. The doubling of the ναί and οὔ serves for emphasis—different from James 5:12. As the reason for this prohibition Jesus gives the occasion for the oath. It is ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ ("from evil"). This can be masculine or neuter: "everything else is from the devil" or "from evil."
The first explanation (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Euthymius) would indeed correspond to the decided opposition of the Old and New Law, but is nevertheless incompatible with the permissibility of the oath in the Old Testament and with God's swearing. One could indeed point with Chrysostom to the analogy in marriage legislation, which in the Old Testament permitted many things that in the New Testament are adultery, but the difference remains that in these cases God merely permitted something not good in itself out of consideration for human weakness and circumstances, but did not himself make use of it. But since God's swearing also occurred only because of human weakness, after the reason has fallen away, what is permissible in itself can become evil without directly originating from the devil.
Thus Chrysostom's explanation is also to be understood: "If these had been from the beginning laws of the devil, they would not have achieved so much. For had these not preceded, the present law would not have been so easily accepted. Thus Christ said this was from evil, not to show that the old law was from the devil, but to convict all the more decidedly of the old nullity." The example cited by Theophylact of circumcision, which in the Old Testament was ordained by God but in the New would nevertheless indicate a relapse, has more similarity with the present case.
Therefore nothing else remains but to understand the neuter and explain it from the evil moral condition that makes the oath necessary. This, however, is mutual, since one can be induced to swear and be induced because of it. In the state of the perfected Messianic kingdom there can be no more talk of any oath, for this would express a doubt about truthfulness and thus a falling away from the perfect state. But as long as the world lies in wickedness (1 John 5:19), it cannot dispense with it.
CONTINUE
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